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Abstract
In the nonprofit industry, lapses in internal controls and low levels of accountability have
resulted in many organizations becoming insolvent. Grounded in the agency theory, the
purpose of this correlational study was to examine the relationship between federal
compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and
internal control infraction. Archival data were collected from 144 nonprofit organizations
in the southeast United States. The results of the multiple regression analyses indicated
the model was able to predict the relationship between federal compliance requirement,
executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction,
F(7, 136) = 6.559, p < .001, R2 = .252, with non-profit type (hospitals), (β = -9.392, t =
7.191, p <0.050), accounting for a higher contribution to the model than executive
compensation, (β = -0.049, t = 1.96, p <0.050). Federal compliance requirement and
nonprofit size did not explain any significant variation in internal control infraction. The
implications for positive social change included the potential for a better understanding
by nonprofit managers of the importance of internal controls, leading to the effective and
efficient provision of goods and services needed by members of society.
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study
Leaders of nonprofit organizations receiving unmodified opinions on their audited
financial statements can create the belief of the existence of effective internal control and
an acceptable level of accountability and performance. However, Carslaw, Pippin, and
Mason (2012), Othman and Ali (2014), Petrovits, Shakespeare, and Shih (2011), and Saat
et al. (2013) provided evidence that many nonprofit organizations lack effective internal
control and an acceptable level of accountability. The number of nonprofit organizations
becoming insolvent because of minimal or no internal control in the baseline period 2000
to 2003 was approximately 5,000 of 311,977 nonprofits filing with the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). This number compared with approximately 12,000 of 236,870 nonprofits
during the period 2009 to 2012 and represented an increase from the baseline time period
using data in the Business Master File maintained by the IRS (Dietz, McKeever, Brown,
Koulish, & Pollak, 2014; Gordon, Fischer, Greenlee, & Keating, 2013; U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2014). The increase in the number of insolvencies between 2000
and 2012 is indicative of the fiscal unsustainability of nonprofits when internal control
infraction exists.
Some cases of insolvency resulted in several financial scandals and in regulators,
auditors, and academics searching for causes (Hoffmann & McSwain, 2013). According
to M. Feng, Li, McVay, and Skaife (2014) and Petrovits et al. (2011), a low level of
internal control in nonprofit organizations has negative consequences on their operations
and increases the possibility of insolvency. This study involved examining the
relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit
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size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction to contribute to the understanding of
the relationship between the independent variables and internal control infraction.
Background of the Problem
Approximately 96% of 11,841 nonprofit organizations examined from 1997 to
1999 received unmodified opinions, thus leading to the public’s belief that effective
financial controls existed for nonprofits, even though nonprofits traditionally did not have
effective internal controls (Keating, Fischer, Gordon, & Greenlee, 2005). An unmodified
opinion includes an assurance that the financial statements of an organization are
reasonably stated and the financial statements, taken as a whole, do not include material
misstatements, whereas a modified opinion does not provide this assurance. Contrary to
the perception of the existence of strong internal control, lapses in accountability and
noncompliance with the Federal Single Audit Act of 1984 have led to higher expectations
regarding governance oversight, risk management, and the detection and prevention of
fraud. The lack of strong internal control increased professional and cognizant monitoring
of the quality of nonprofit accounting, reporting, and compliance (McNally, 2013; Office
of Management and Budget, 2015; Williams & Taylor, 2013). Some nonprofits, such as
Roslyn District School Board in New York, United Way of America, Covenant House,
United Cancer Council, American Red Cross, Tuskegee University, and McKenzie
College lost funding or became insolvent (Carslaw et al., 2012; Hamilton & Slatten,
2013; Keating et al., 2005). Problems with accountability and noncompliance with
regulatory standards have resulted in regulators, practitioners, and academics searching

3
for the causes (Carslaw et al., 2012; McNally, 2013; Office of Management and Budget,
2015; Othman & Ali, 2014; Petrovits et al., 2011; Saat et al., 2013).
The focus in prior research by Carslaw et al. (2012), Keating et al. (2005), and
Saat et al. (2013) included the frequency of internal control infraction, the level of
internal control between small and large nonprofits, nonprofit type, and the effects of new
laws and regulations on the level of internal control infraction. Evidence provided by
Carslaw et al., Keating et al., and Saat et al. included cases of smaller nonprofits, those
new to government grants, and those with prior audit findings having lower levels of
internal control. They also included evidence that many nonprofits are failing to be
accountable, as the majority of nonprofit organizations in the United States are small
entities (Carslaw et al., 2012; Gordon et al., 2013; Petrovits et al., 2011). Factors
contributing to the level of internal control in nonprofits and the lack of accountability
were not the focus of these prior studies.
Problem Statement
Many nonprofit organizations lack effective internal control, and as a result, some
experience a lack of funding and insolvency (Saat et al., 2013). The number of nonprofit
organizations registered with the IRS from 2012 to 2013 decreased 2.1% from 1.44
million to 1.41 million, partly due to insolvency as a result of minimal or no internal
control (IRS, 2014). The general business problem was that lack of internal control
negatively affects the ability of nonprofit organizations to remain solvent. The specific
business problem was that some nonprofit managers do not know the relationship
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between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size,
nonprofit type, and internal control infraction.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between the independent variables (i.e., federal compliance requirement,
executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type) and the dependent variable
(internal control infraction). The targeted population consisted of archival data records
from nonprofit social services organizations, schools, institutions of higher learning,
housing organizations, and hospitals in the southeast region of the United States. The
implications for positive social change include the potential for nonprofit boards of
directors and executives to increase their awareness of nonprofit business leaders’ social
responsibility to beneficiaries and positive social change in their behavior. Nonprofit
business leaders can improve operational efficiencies in the provision of social,
education, housing, health, and economic development services to those in society and
communities who need them the most.
Nature of the Study
I used a quantitative methodology for this study. The quantitative methodology
involves describing and testing theories deductively from existing knowledge by
developing hypothesized cause-and-effect relationships among measurable variables
(Sarma, 2015). The quantitative method was the best fit for this study because the study
involved examining the relationships between the variables. The qualitative method is a
systematic inquiry with a focus on understanding social beings and the nature of their
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interaction with themselves and their surroundings and used to develop theory
inductively (Sarma, 2015). Therefore, the qualitative method was inappropriate for this
study because I tested a theory, which is a deductive approach. The mixed methods
approach includes both quantitative and qualitative methods and has a focus on different
dimensions of the same phenomenon (Bentahar & Cameron, 2015). Because the mixed
methods approach involves extensive data collection and analyses of textual and
numerical data, it is time consuming and cost intensive. The exclusion of the qualitative
research method from this study made the mixed methods approach inappropriate.
I used a correlational design in this study. Farrelly (2013) and Jerejian, Reid, and
Rees (2013) used correlational designs to examine relationships between independent
variables and dependent variables. The correlational design was appropriate for this study
because of the examination of the relationship between independent variables and the
dependent variable. A characteristic of the experimental and quasi-experimental designs
is the measurement of the effect of an intervention on an outcome (Curtis et al., 2015).
There was no intervention in this study; therefore, the experimental and quasiexperimental designs were not appropriate.
Research Question
What is the relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive
compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction?
Hypotheses
Two major elements in research design are hypotheses and the variables used to
test them. This study involved testing the following hypotheses to find answers to the
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research question: What is the relationship between federal compliance requirement,
executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction?
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between federal compliance
requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control
infraction.
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between federal compliance
requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control
infraction.
Theoretical Framework
Ross and Mitnick developed the theory of agency independently and concurrently
in 1972 (Mitnick, 2013). Ross developed the economic theory of agency, while Mitnick
developed the institutional theory of agency. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and
Meckling (1976) used the institutional theory of agency to explain the principal–agent
relationship and accountability in organizations. Agency theory is a means to determine
the most efficient contract between the principal and the agent when their goals differ and
when it is difficult or expensive to verify that what the agent is doing is an objective of
the agency relationship (Bosse & Phillips, 2016). L’Huillier (2014) used agency theory to
support the belief that intrinsic incentives resulting from agency contracts are a
mechanism to control the behavior of leaders of nonprofit organizations, and the research
on agency theory provides possible reasons for nonprofit business leaders complying
with federal compliance requirement.
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A proposition is that differences in the sharing of risk arise when the principal and
agent prefer different actions because of differences in nonprofit type. The actions of
nonprofit business leaders depend on the type of nonprofit organization involved. For
example, leaders of service organizations are accountable to funders, sector regulators,
and clients, that is, the principals (Baapogmah, Mayer, Chien, & Afolabi, 2015).
However, the leaders of a network organization who seek policy change are accountable
to members (the principals). Different types of nonprofit organizations have multiple
principals (donors, clients, and the public) with conflicting or incongruent interests and
differences in the relationship between principals and agents (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du
Bois, & Jegers, 2012). Agency theory was the theoretical lens chosen for this study
because Baapogmah et al. (2015), Balsam and Harris (2014), Bosse and Phillips (2016),
Ma and Wang (2014), McGowan, Yurova, and Chan (2014), Van Puyvelde et al. (2012),
and Voulgaris, Stathopoulos, and Walker (2014) concluded that independent variables
similar to the variables chosen for this study (federal compliance requirement, executive
compensation, nonprofit size, and nonprofit type are some of the propositions of the
theory.
Operational Definitions
Precise meanings of the terms in this study are important for understanding the
findings and conclusions. Without understanding the key terms included in this section, it
would not be possible to evaluate the research or determine whether a researcher has
achieved the objectives of a research project. Because dictionary definitions may vary
from the meanings given to the terms in this research project, it is important to keep these
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definitions in mind while evaluating the evidence and conclusions documented in this
research.
Accountability: Accountability refers to adherence to contract agreements that
results in a high level of internal control in nonprofit organizations. Measuring
accountability involves examining the relationship between federal compliance
requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control
infraction and calculating the operational efficiency ratio of program expenses to total
expenses (Harris, Petrovits, & Yetman, 2014).
Cognizant agency: A cognizant agency is a federal agency from which a recipient
organization receives its largest federal grant or most of its funding and provides
oversight on the expenditure of federal funds (López, Rich, & Smith, 2013).
Complexity: Complexity refers to the number of federal compliance requirements
for federal funding programs. OMB Circular A-133 Supplement 2015 includes the federal
compliance requirements for federal funding programs (Saat et al., 2013). A metric of the
number of federal compliance requirements prepared from information provided in OMB
Circular A-133 Supplement 2015 served as an independent variable in this study.
Internal control: The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) Framework includes a definition of internal control as a process
developed and implemented by boards of directors, management, and other personnel.
The framework is designed to provide reasonable assurance that an organization will
achieve its objectives in the following categories: effectiveness and efficiency of
operations, the reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and
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regulations (COSO, 2013). Internal control is the primary mechanism to guide and
monitor organizational personnel in the performance of their duties. Internal control is the
accountability and governance tool of an organization to help deter, prevent, and detect
errors, fraud, and corruption.
Nonprofit organization: A nonprofit organization is an organization whose
leaders do not distribute its surplus funds to owners or shareholders but instead use them
to help pursue its goals (Tucker & Parker, 2013). In the United States, a nonprofit
organization is exempt from income and property taxation.
OMB Circular A-133 Supplement 2015: The Federal Single Audit Act of 1984
and its associated regulations require a rigorous, organization-wide examination of any
entity whose leaders expend $750,000 or more of federal funds and has been effective for
single audits of fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2015. The objective of the
single audit is to assure the U.S. federal government that the management and use of such
funds meet the compliance requirements of cognizant agencies (Office of Management
and Budget, 2015).
Quality control review: A single audit quality control review is an audit
conducted to ensure recipients of federal funds spend the funds in compliance with
federal program requirements (Stone, 2012). The review can also help to ensure the
recipients demonstrate effectiveness in administrating federal grants, have good
governance, develop systems to ensure fiscal honesty, and adhere to their missions.
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Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions in research are self-evident truths that must be valid or the research
is meaningless (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Assumptions are something a researcher
accepts as true without concrete proof. Explicitly documenting research assumptions may
help reduce misunderstanding and resistance to research (Simon & Goes, 2013).
Limitations are unexpected circumstances not under the control of a researcher and
constrain the interpretation of the findings (Cagle & Pridgen, 2015; Connelly, 2013).
Delimitations refer to the scope or bounds of a study (Simon & Goes, 2013). Based on
the design of this study, there were several assumptions, limitations, and delimitations.
Assumptions
Assumptions serve as the foundation of any research (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).
Leedy and Ormond (2010) posited that assumptions are basic to research, and without
them, a research problem could not exist. In this study, one assumption was that the
selected sample would be representative of the population toward which I made the
inferences. Another assumption was that the data were accurate and measured what I
intended to measure.
Limitations
Limitations are constraints on the generalizability of research findings and the
methods used to establish the validity of the study and are weaknesses inherent to a study
design (Cagle & Pridgen, 2015; Connelly, 2013). The collection of archival data was a
step in this study, but this type of data collection includes inherent weaknesses (Feng,
Ling, Neely, & Roberts, 2014). According to Feng et al. (2014), the weaknesses of
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archival data are (a) archival data may include preparation errors that affect the reliability
of the data, (b) archival data may include mathematical errors, (c) archival data may be
incomplete because some organizations need not report their information due to size bias,
and (d) archival data format may not be user friendly.
Other limitations of this study were the exclusion of an evaluation of the quality
of the accounting, reporting, and compliance systems of nonprofits, even though
managers can hide weaknesses in internal control from auditors and have difficulty
obtaining a large enough sample, which necessitates less robust data analysis techniques.
The use of less robust data analysis techniques limits the quality of evidence available to
address research questions and hypotheses (Feng et al., 2014).
A probabilistic sampling method was suitable for this study because probability
enables deductive reasoning; thus, an assumption existed that there was a specified
distribution of the population values (Uprichard, 2013). Some weaknesses for this
sampling approach were that this method is tedious and time consuming, especially when
creating larger samples (Uprichard, 2013). According to Uprichard (2013), probability
sampling necessitates that researchers know about all possible units that will undergo
sampling.
Delimitations
Delimitations refer to conscious exclusionary and inclusionary decisions that
define the boundaries of a study (Simon & Goes, 2013). In this study, leaders of
organizations expending $750,000 or more of federal funds were the only organizations
included in the population, which limited the generalizability of the findings, as many
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nonprofits expend less than $750,000. The targeted population did not include archival
data records from government-dependent organizations such as community service
boards and economic development boards. Nonprofit social services organizations,
schools, institutions of higher learning, housing organizations, and hospitals in the
southeast region of the United States were the only types of organizations included in the
sample. The southeast region of the United States had a large number of nonprofit
organizations suitable for inclusion in the study and therefore comprised the area selected
for this study. This study also included a restriction with regard to time, as the sample
included only data for the calendar year 2015. These exclusionary and inclusionary
decisions limited the generalizability of this study’s findings to other types of nonprofit
organizations, years, and regions of the United States.
Significance of the Study
The significance of this study is that the findings include valuable information
regarding predictors of the level of internal control infraction, which nonprofit business
leaders could use to develop and implement strong internal controls. Nonprofit business
leaders will have a tool to aid in identifying fiscal interventions to positively leverage
internal control outcomes. The goal of this study was to increase understanding of the
relationship between the independent variables (i.e., federal compliance requirement,
executive compensation, nonprofit size, and nonprofit type) and internal control
infraction in nonprofit organizations in the southeast region of the United States. The
results of this study may increase nonprofit business leaders’ understanding of the
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predictors of internal control infraction and improve their accountability to nonprofit
beneficiaries and other stakeholders.
Contribution to Business Practice
Nonprofit business leaders may use the information obtained on the predictors of
internal control infraction to identify fiscal interventions to leverage internal control
outcomes positively, improve the operational efficiencies of nonprofit organizations, and
better serve those most in need in society and communities through their organizations’
services. Nonprofit organizations that are efficient can benefit society by providing
social, education, housing, health, and economic development services to beneficiaries
(Arvidson & Lyon, 2014).
Implications for Social Change
The implications for positive social change include the potential for nonprofit
business leaders to increase their awareness of their social responsibility to beneficiaries
by understanding the predictors of internal control infraction. Business leaders of
nonprofit organizations who understand the predictors of internal control infraction may
improve operational efficiencies in the provision of social, educational, housing, health,
and economic development services to those in society and communities who need them
the most.
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature
The adverse consequences of internal control infraction on nonprofit
organizations indicate the importance of internal control to the success and sustainability
of these organizations (Carslaw et al., 2012; Hamilton & Slatten, 2013). According to
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Feng et al. (2014) and Petrovits et al. (2011), the low level of internal control in nonprofit
organizations has negative consequences on organizations’ donor and grantor support,
thus increasing the possibility of insolvency. The researchers above (i.e., Carslaw et al.,
2012; Feng et al., 2014; Hamilton & Slatten, 2013; and Petrovits et al., 2011) examined
factors related to organizational accountability and the relevance of internal control to
accountability and sustainability using multiple linear regression analysis. Their findings
included evidence of smaller nonprofits, those new to government grants, and those with
prior audit findings had a lower level of internal control. These findings, as well as the
findings of Gordon et al. (2013) and Petrovits et al. (2011), included evidence that many
nonprofit business leaders are failing to be accountable, as the majority of nonprofit
organizations in the United States are small entities. However, many variables might
relate to the level of internal control infraction in nonprofit organizations but were not the
focus of these previous studies.
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit
size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction. Two major elements in research
design are the hypotheses and the variables used to test them. This study involved testing
the following hypotheses to find answers to the research question: What is the
relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit
size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction?
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H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between federal compliance
requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control
infraction.
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between federal compliance
requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control
infraction.
This section began with a brief discussion of the relationship between the
sustainability of nonprofit organizations and the level of internal control in nonprofits, the
purpose of the study, and the hypotheses. The review continued with the search strategy
for the literature review and a discussion of agency theory. A discussion followed of the
construction of the theory and of the ways researchers have used it to explain the
relationship between the financial performance of nonprofit organizations and the level of
internal control, its relevance to this study, and why it was selected, as well as supporting
and contrasting theories. The last part of the literature review included analysis and
synthesis of recent research on the relationship between the independent variables of this
study and the dependent variable, the internal control framework and federal laws related
to internal control, and an overview of nonprofit organization leaders’ accountability.
Search Strategy for the Literature Review
The strategy for searching the literature included a detailed examination of peerreviewed journals, government reports, and seminal scholarly books using a variety of
databases. Internal control, accountability, and nonprofit organizations were the primary
words used in searches. The searches involved using related articles and citations in other
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journals. The process involved identifying more than 250 journal articles, and 143
emerged as relevant to this study. Eighty-six percent of the total sources cited were peerreviewed, and 85% had publication dates of 5 years or less from the anticipated
completion date in 2017. The basis for including some articles published before 2013 was
their relevance to the topic of this study.
Understanding Agency Theory
Ross and Mitnick developed the theory of agency independently and concurrently
in 1972 (Mitnick, 2013). Ross developed the economic theory of agency, while Mitnick
developed the institutional theory of agency. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and
Meckling (1976) used the institutional theory of agency to explain the principal–agent
relationship and accountability by leaders in organizations. The theory is applicable for
examining accountability issues in nonprofit organizations, as the theory recognizes the
issues of goal conflict, information asymmetry, and uncertainty of outcomes from the
relationship between principals and agents (Frias‐Aceituno, Rodriguez‐Ariza, &
Garcia‐Sanchez, 2013; Namazi, 2013; Okolie, 2014). Sinclair, Hooper, and Ayoub (2013)
provided an explanation for the relationship between the level of accountability and
internal control in nonprofit organizations and deduced that the relationship is from
agency theory. Fama and Jensen, as well as and Jensen and Meckling, used agency theory
to explain the principal–agent relationship. They contended the leaders of nonprofit
organizations have a lower level of accountability given their inherent asymmetric
payoffs; that is, there are fewer penalties for poor accounting, reporting, and compliance

17
in nonprofits than in for-profit organizations. This study involved using agency theory to
examine the relationship between nonprofit accountability and internal control infraction.
Unlike for-profit organizations, nonprofits had fewer lawsuits for ineffective and
inefficient internal control. Because of these asymmetries, state and federal agencies
instituted compliance guidelines for monitoring nonprofits’ activities (Okolie, 2014;
Schubert, 2014; Sinclair et al., 2013). The intent of monitoring performed by personnel in
state and federal agencies is to reduce asymmetric incentives. Because nonprofit business
leaders experience fewer consequences for ineffective and inefficient internal control
within their organizations, state and federal guidelines and monitoring should lead to
effective and efficient internal control and better operating performance.
The intrinsic incentives resulting from the agency relationship provide a
mechanism to control the behavior of leaders of nonprofit organizations. Advocates of
agency theory support the belief that agency relationships in organizations play a large
part in nonprofit business leaders complying with state and federal compliance guidelines
(Bosse & Phillips, 2016; L'Huillier, 2014). Directing the behavior of nonprofit business
leaders to maintain effective and efficient internal control and a level of accountability to
beneficiaries and other stakeholders is the desired outcome of the agency relationship.
Agency theory was the theoretical lens chosen for this study because it would provide an
explanation of the behavior of nonprofit business leaders regarding their accountability to
beneficiaries and other stakeholders and to effective and efficient internal control.
The agency relationship in the nonprofit sector occurs through stakeholders’
relationships rather than through the ownership interests of principals within these
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organizations. Nonprofit organizations do not have owners, but stakeholders create the
principal–agent relationship (Daily & Dalton, 2015; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Harrison &
Wicks, 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Sinclair et al., 2013; Van Puyvelde et al., 2012;
Wellens & Jegers, 2014). Leaders of nonprofit organizations are accountable to various
stakeholders, such as clients, donors, board members, staff, and the government, who
assume the role of surrogate owners (Tucker & Parker, 2013). In the absence of clearly
defined principals in the nonprofit environment, agency problems are complex. To
resolve problems arising from the nature of the agency relationship, leaders of nonprofit
organizations must implement internal control systems that address agency problems.
An agency relationship represents a contract because at the core of an agencystructured relationship is presumptive cooperative behavior between a principal and an
agent at the management level. Van Puyvelde et al. (2012) contended an inherent goal
conflict exists between the principal and the agent based on the inducements and
contributions of the employment relationship. Namazi’s (2013) findings included
evidence that risk sharing occurs among individuals and groups and contended risksharing problems arise when cooperating individuals have different attitudes toward risk.
Bosse and Phillips (2016) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) concurred the domain of the
agency theory is the relationship between principal and agent and mirrors a contract, thus
broadening the risk-sharing literature by including agency problems. Although agency
relationships represent contracts, goal conflict and differences in risk sharing exist
between principal and agent, which affects nonprofit business leaders’ accountability and
internal control.
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An assumption of agency theory is that a conflict of interest exists between the
principals (beneficiaries of goods and services provided by nonprofit organizations) and
the agents (managers) relating to the benefits received, compensation, and productive
efforts. Both parties in the principal–agent relationship want to maximize their residual
income (i.e., benefits received and income), and there is a conflict of interest between
principals and agents (Bosse & Phillips, 2016; L’Huillier, 2014; Rashid, 2015). Due to
this conflict of interest, the principal–agent relationship will result in agency costs (Van
Puyvelde et al., 2012). However, maximizing the residual income available to principals
requires the minimization of costs, including agency costs.
The preceding discussion indicated agency theory enables the understanding of
compensation structures for top organizational executives. In addition to articulating the
relevance of incentives, agency theory has organizational, system evaluation, behavioral,
allocation, and optimal control monitoring roles (Bosse & Phillips, 2016; Namazi, 2013).
The organizational role arises because agency theory includes a reason why managerial
control in an organization is necessary and ways to achieve control; that is, by resolving
the information asymmetry problem in which the principal implements control measures,
such as voluntary disclosures (Cordery, 2013; Zhuang, Saxton, & Wu, 2014). The basis
of such control measures are observable performance outcomes, and hence, the system
evaluation role of agency theory. The assumption that an agent does not perform in the
best interest of the principal and that the agent is work-averse explains the behavioral role
of the agency theory. The principal could use the board to monitor top executives and
describe governance practices to solve agency problems.
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Agents’ interests may align with the interests of shareholders through stock-based
compensation (Essen, Engelen, & Carney, 2013; Ma & Wang, 2014). Ma and Wang
(2014) and Murphy (2013) provided evidence that a positive relationship exists between
granting stock options (i.e., performance-based compensation) and managerial risk-taking
behavior. This relationship led to a high level of internal control infraction in nonprofit
organizations. On Contrary to Ma and Wang’s findings, Blazovich (2013) documented
that managerial risk propensity does not differ statistically whether the basis for
executives’ compensation is on performance or position within the organization. The
mixed findings of these studies revealed the need for additional research on the
relationship between performance-based and salary-based compensation.
Nonprofit business leaders use contracts to coalign the goals of principal and
agent, which leads to the question of whether a behavior-oriented contract (e.g., executive
salary) is more efficient than an outcome-oriented contract (e.g., bonus, commissions) in
influencing the behavior of agents. Agency theory is suitable for understanding executive
compensation and agents’ actions and includes a focus on getting the most efficient
contract to govern the principal–agent relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to
agency theory researchers (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hou et al., 2014; Jensen & Meckling,
1976), executives of organizations may attempt to maximize their compensation by
providing less accountability; however, the lower level of accountability results in a high
level of internal control infraction. The premise that executives attempt to maximize their
compensation supports the contention that individuals are self-interested and risk averse;
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therefore, getting the most efficient contract to govern the principal–agent relationship is
important to influence the behavior of agents.
The allocation role of agency theory develops from the assumption that it is
possible to derive a contract that maximizes the utility of the agent and the principal and
leads to the efficient allocation of company resources and risk sharing. Also, a control
system serves as a mechanism that the agent and principal can agree will provide the type
of information needed for control and efficient risk sharing (Namazi, 2013). Thus, agency
theory is a sound basis for assessing the optimality of managerial accounting systems as
well as performance evaluation systems. In support of Namazi’s findings, Mirrlees and
Raimondo (2013) provided evidence that it is possible to find a level of remuneration and
a level of control leading to an alignment of the objectives of the principal and the agent.
Mirrlees and Raimondo’s findings also included evidence that this alignment is the point
of equilibrium. Thus, optimal contracts are those leading to the attainment of the point of
equilibrium.
An understanding of the relationship between nonprofit business leaders’
accountability and the expectations of beneficiaries and governments is important to
address agency problems. Baapogmah et al. (2015), Cordery, Proctor-Thomson, and
Smith (2013), Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Van Puyvelde
et al. (2012) examined the relationship between principals and agents in nonprofit
organizations and the potential of agency theory to resolve questions of accountability to
internal and external stakeholders. Their research findings provided evidence that a
relationship exists between nonprofit organization leaders’ accountability and the
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expectations of beneficiaries and governments to whom nonprofit business leaders are
accountable. Nonprofit business leaders are accountability for the areas of finance and
operations, disclosure and transparency of financial transactions and the use of funds, and
oversight of the organization’s management decisions. To achieve the expectations of
beneficiaries and governments, nonprofit business leaders must implement control
mechanisms that address agency problems, such as internal control systems. Agency
theory is appropriate for this study because it addressed the accountability of nonprofit
business leaders and the expectations of beneficiaries and governments, and it contributed
to the research on the effectiveness and efficiency of internal control and operations of
organizations.
Positivist agency and principal-agent research. The development of agency
theory occurred similarly to the development of positivist and principal–agent theories
(Schubert, 2014). Positivist agency researchers attempt to identify cases in which conflict
exists between the agent and the principal and describe the appropriate form of
governance that will prevent agents from acting in self-interest (Eisenhardt, 1989).
According to Eisenhardt (1989), when the contract between the principal and the agent is
outcome based, the agent is more likely to behave in the interest of the principal. When
the principal has information to verify the agent’s behavior, the agent is more likely to
behave in the interest of the principal. Principal–agent researchers focus on the principal–
agent relationship, on the optimal contract, and on executives’ behavior versus the
outcome between the principal and the agent.
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Positivist and principal–agent studies include common views that contracting
problems occur because of the self-interest maximizing objective of both the principal
and the agent and because the concern of both is minimizing agency costs. However,
where the focus of the principal–agent researchers was on risk sharing and the nature of
what constitutes an optimal contract, the focus of the positivist agency researchers is on
aspects of the organizational environment and technology concerned with monitoring the
contractual relationship. Eisenhardt (1989) highlighted the concern with the nature of the
preferences of the principal and the agent, the nature of uncertainty, and the information
structure within nonprofits. The concern of positivist agency researchers was capital
intensity, information costs, capital markets, and the nature of internal and external
markets. As such, the positivist theory is nonmathematical.
Rival theories of agency theory. In tandem with the development of the various
conceptual definitions of accountability, existing literature includes various theoretical
frameworks through which nonprofit business leaders achieve accountability and
efficiency in performance. As suggested by Turbide and Laurin (2014) and Van Puyvelde
et al. (2012), to resolve problems arising from the nature of the agency relationship,
leaders of nonprofit organizations can complement agency theory with other theoretical
approaches, such as the stakeholder and stewardship theories. Sinclair et al. (2013),
Tremblay-Boire and Prakash (2015), and Wellens and Jegers (2014) were instrumental in
advancing the use of stakeholder theory to understand accountability to multiple
stakeholders. Nonprofit stakeholders are those affected by the activities of nonprofit
organizations. A central premise of the stakeholder theory is, by focusing on all
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stakeholders, the creation of value by the firm is good for firm performance. However,
the stakeholder theory does not explain the conflict in the interest and goals of the various
stakeholders in the firm, whereas agency theory does explain the conflict (Harrison &
Wicks, 2013; O’Brien & Tooley, 2013; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). For example,
shareholders can withdraw from the firm by selling their shares, while other stakeholders,
such as employees and beneficiaries, may find it difficult to change their employment
abruptly or may lose an essential source of goods and services should they withdraw from
the firm.
The stewardship theory appeared in research by O’Brien and Tooley (2013) and
Turbide and Laurin (2014) to explain the concept of accountability and governance and
to show that agents are stewards of the resources provided to them. O’Brien and Tooley
noted the possible basis for the roles and responsibilities of agents, for providing goods
and services to those most in need, and for developing effective methods of internal
control, is accountability. Similarly, Van Puyvelde et al. (2012) used stewardship theory
to indicate agents would act in the best interest of the principal, even when their interests
diverge. Thus, agents expect to accomplish personal outcomes of achievement and selfactualization, as well as the alignment of the goals of the agent and principal. The
interests and goals of principal and agent under the stewardship theory are different from
the interests and goals of the principal and agent under the agency theory.
Namazi (2013), Ross (2013), and Van Puyvelde et al. (2012) noted there is an
inherent conflict of interest between the principal and agent resulting in a low level of
internal control and inefficiencies in operations. Sinclair et al. (2013) indicated the
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application of the stewardship theory helps in understanding the roles and responsibilities
of agents for accountability but does not explain the conflict between principal and agent
in nonprofit organizations, which was why agency theory was the theoretical lens chosen
for this study. Bernstein, Buse, and Bilimoria (2016) and O’Brien and Tooley (2013)
have critiqued, criticized, and defended the stewardship theory. However, these critiques
are beyond the scope of this research.
The relationship between agency theory and accountability. The concept of
accountability lacks a precise definition (Mohammed, 2013). From a normative
perspective, the concept of accountability evokes a sense of responsibility to others for
performance, compliance, disclosure of information and transparency, and efficient
delivery of goods and services to those in need of assistance. Accountability also denotes
external responses regarding compliance with laws and industry standards. Sinclair et al.
(2013) adapted the core definition of accountability with a focus on what to account for
instead of on the four components of accountability: transparency, answerability,
compliance, and enforcement. However, Saxton, Neely, and Guo (2014) noted the
components contribute to accountability by collecting information; making it available
and accessible for public scrutiny; providing clear reasons for actions and decisions;
monitoring and evaluating procedures and outcomes; and helping to enforce sanctions for
shortfalls in compliance, justification, or transparency. Because of the lack of agreement
on a precise definition of accountability, an understanding of the relationship between
principal and agent is necessary to determine the effect of agency theory on nonprofit
organization leaders’ accountability.
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O’Brien and Tooley (2013) and Tremblay-Boire and Prakash (2015) contended
the definition of accountability with a focus on what to account for is too narrow and
recommended broadening this external and punitive dimension to incorporate an internal
dimension where decision makers take responsibility for themselves. With this, the
primary concern of accountability should be providing sufficient and meaningful
financial and nonfinancial information and enabling an understanding of the purpose and
achievements of nonprofit organizations. The implementation of effective and efficient
internal control systems facilitates the provision of sufficient and meaningful information
(Virtanen & Takala, 2016). The primary benefit for organizations whose leaders accept
this notion of accountability is greater congruence among the organizations’ mission,
internal control, and regulatory compliance.
The definition of accountability for purposes of this study is as the operational
efficiency ratio or the ratio of program expenses to total expenses, as in the study by
Yetman and Yetman (2012) and as widely used in other research as a measure of
efficiency and performance. However, following research by Arshad, Abu Bakar, Thani,
and Omar (2013), Saat et al. (2013), and Sinclair et al. (2013), the definition of
accountability in this study is nonprofit business leaders’ adherence to contract
agreements resulting in a high level of internal control. A nonprofit organization is
effective and has an acceptability level of internal control if it receives an answer of “no”
in its single audit report for weaknesses (i.e., reportable conditions, material weaknesses,
material noncompliance, and questioned costs) in internal control.
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Carslaw et al. (2012), McNally (2013), Othman and Ali (2012), Petrovits et al.
(2011), and Saat et al. (2013) examined the reasons for lapses in accountability by
organizations’ leaders and instances of noncompliance with federal compliance
requirement. The lapses resulted in government regulators, accounting and audit
practitioners, and academics searching for the causes. Fama and Jensen (1983) and
Jensen and Meckling (1976) examined the theory of agency and accountability by leaders
in organizations and used the theory to explain the principal–agent relationship. The
leaders of nonprofit organizations provide lower levels of accountability given their
inherent asymmetric payoffs; that is, fewer penalties for poor accounting, reporting, and
compliance in nonprofits than in for-profit organizations (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen
& Meckling, 1976). Researchers and practitioners may understand the relationship
between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size,
nonprofit type, and internal control infraction and the importance of accountability by the
leaders of nonprofit organizations through a focus on agency theory and the variables
relating to accountability.
The issue of accountability concerning nonprofit organizations is relative to the
nature of the organization and within the context of the relationship between the various
constituents. For example, an organization can be accountable to funders, regulators, and
clients, who according to their functional relationship are the principals of the
organization (Baapogmah et al., 2015; O’Brien & Tooley, 2013). Within this context,
Virtanen and Takala (2016) posited the focus of nonprofit accountability is on to whom
the organization is accountable and for what. Anecdotal evidence supported the premise
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that whereas the leaders of public companies have traditionally operated within a strong
accountability environment, nonprofit organizations have not (Ebrahim, Battilana, &
Mair, 2014; Gordon et al., 2013). Saxton et al. (2014) contended the management of
nonprofit organizations, at a minimum, is accountable in three aspects: finances,
performance, and fairness toward various constituents (e.g., employees, contractors,
clients, and citizens). Baapogmah et al.’s research included the finding that accountability
involves financial sustainability and value creation. However, other findings did not
include similar dimensions of accountability in nonprofit organizations, as the legitimacy
of such organizations has been more in tune with their role in the provision of social and
cultural services, particularly among the poor (Sinclair et al., 2013). Sinclair et al. (2013)
asserted that leaders of nonprofits should justify their organizations’ existence and the
furtherance of their social objectives by providing support to the disadvantaged members
of society. With more support for this view, there has been greater advocacy for more
accountability to many different stakeholders.
Petrovits et al. (2011) provided evidence on the enactment of the Federal Single
Audit Act of 1984 and the impact of the act on the level of accountability by leaders of
nonprofit organizations. The evidence supported the assertion that effective internal
control contributes to the quality of accountability. However, leaders of nonprofit
organizations receiving unmodified opinions on their audited financial statements may
not note the existence of effective internal control and an acceptable level of
accountability (Keating & Frumkin, 2003). Because there is no standard way to define
accountability and the objectives and definitions of internal control often differ for each
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organization, challenges to the effectiveness of internal control as a measure of
accountability is possible.
Only recently have academic researchers addressed accountability by nonprofit
organizations’ leaders, and there are few empirical discussions of nonprofit organizations
leaders’ accountability. The lack of studies resulted from the absence of external
standards or benchmarks for nonprofit organizations, such as rules of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX; Yasmin,
Haniffa, & Hudaib, 2014). However, accounting standards and management principles
exist to guide leaders of nonprofit organizations in developing strategies for
accountability, and nonprofit business leaders can voluntarily comply with the sections of
SOX related to accountability. Developing strategies and measurable goals requires an
understanding of factors related to accountability. For this reason, the relationship
between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size,
nonprofit type, and internal control infraction underwent examination through the
perspective of agency theory.
Empirical Studies of the Independent and Dependent Variables
The findings of the studies discussed in this literature review included mixed
evidence that a relationship exists between nonprofit type, executive compensation,
nonprofit size, and internal control infraction. Understanding the principal–agent
relationship is important to examine the relationship between the independent and the
dependent variables in this study. Bosse and Phillips (2016) and Jensen and Meckling
(1976) posited the focus in the principal–agent relationship is on risk-sharing. To
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understand the effect of risk-sharing on the variables in this study, I examined the
relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit
size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction through the perspective of agency
theory.
The purpose of this study was to extend the research and literature on internal
control in nonprofit organizations by examining the relationship between federal
compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and
internal control infraction. The basis for identifying variables in this study is the review
of previous studies relevant to agency theory and the determinants of weak or a lack of
internal control in nonprofit organizations. The proposition of this study was that
researchers could use agency theory to explain the relationship between the independent
and the dependent variables of this study. The null hypothesis of this research was no
statistically significant relationship exists between federal compliance requirement,
executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction.
Variables included in previous studies helped to address the issue of whether agency
relationships in nonprofit organizations directly influence the relationship between the
independent and the dependent variables.
Federal compliance requirement. Petrovits et al. (2011) documented
determinants, such as financial health, the pace of growth, the complexity of regulations,
amount of government funding, and size of nonprofits, as having a relationship with
internal control infraction. Petrovits et al. conducted a multiple regression analysis using
the complexity of funding source requirements, nonprofit size, growth, going concern
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risk, and audit firm as independent variables and internal control infraction as the
dependent variable. Using a model consisting of the five independent variables, Petrovits
et al. found that growth, going concern risk, and audit firm were significant predictors of
internal control infraction (R2 = .36, n = 44,353, p < .16); however, the coefficient on
federal compliance requirement and nonprofit size was negative. Contrary to the findings
included in Petrovits et al.’s study, Saat et al. (2013) used the charity level of internal
control implementation model and found that nonprofit organizations with a greater
scope of operations and complexity of compliance requirements were more likely to
encounter internal control infraction. The mixed results of these two studies for the
predictor variable, complexity of compliance requirement, provided motivation for this
study.
Some nonprofit organizations, such as United Way of America, Covenant House,
United Cancer Council, American Red Cross, Tuskegee University, and McKenzie
College, fell out of favor with donors and grantors or went out of business because of lost
funding due to noncompliance with federal compliance requirements (Carslaw et al.,
2012; Hamilton & Slatten, 2013; Lam, Klein, Freisthler, & Weiss, 2013). This finding
supported the premise that government agencies used information about internal control
to make funding decisions; therefore, it is important for nonprofit business leaders to
understand the relationship between federal compliance requirement and internal control
infraction because federal funding of the 1.41 million nonprofit organizations reporting to
the IRS in 2015 was 24.5% of total nonprofit revenue of $2.26 trillion. This percentage
was a large percentage that helped to sustain nonprofit organizations (McKeever, 2015).
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However, an extensive examination of the influence of federal compliance requirement
(i.e., financial and program compliance requirements) on internal control infraction
identified during the audits of nonprofit organizations has not occurred. In this study, the
lack of extensive examinations of the relationship between federal compliance
requirement and internal control infraction was a motivation for the inclusion of this
variable.
Executive compensation. An examination of the effects of the compensation of
chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) on the quality of
internal control and the relationship between incentives for performance-based
compensation and internal control quality over financial reporting since the enactment of
the SOX, Section 404, took place by Kobelsky, Lim, and Jha (2013). Kobelsky et al.
provided evidence that a statistically positive relationship (R2 = .18, n = 3,654, p < .01)
existed between CEOs’ salary compensation and internal control infraction. Performancebased compensation sensitivity (i.e., short-term and long-term incentives) was negative
for CFOs (p < .05) but not for CEOs with the magnitude of internal control infraction
reported. A positive relationship existed between CEOs’ performance-based
compensation and the internal control infraction reported. The strength of the study by
Kobelsky et al. was its large sample size.
Hou, Priem, and Goranova (2014) and Kobelsky et al. (2013) used agency theory
to explain the relationship between executive compensation and agents’ actions, as well
as to identify the most efficient contract to govern the relationship between agent and
principal. Nonprofit business leaders used incentives to align the interest of the agent and
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principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). Principal–agent researchers have sought to identify the most
efficient contract under changing variables, such as measures of uncertainty, risk
aversion, and information. Hou et al. suggested that agency theory explained the
relationship between CEO compensation, firm size, and firm performance. The analysis
of sample firms by Hou et al. (2014) showed a decline in firm performance from nonperformance-based compensation (i.e., salary) or a statistically significant negative
relationship (R2 = -.06, n = 1,558, p < .01) between non-performance-based compensation
and firm performance. There was an opposite effect for performance-based compensation
(i.e., bonuses and options). The results also indicated that a positive correlation existed
between firm size and firm performance (r = .30, p < .001). A key strength of Hou et al.’s
study was the variance inflation factor for the models (2.94), which was well below
critical levels. This value means multicollinearity did not exist. Likewise, Sedatole,
Swaney, Yetman, and Yetman (2013) posited a relationship existed between CEOs’
compensation (pay-for-performance) and the performance metrics of nonprofit
organizations.
Nonprofit size. Petrovits et al. (2011) examined the relationship between the
complexity of funding source requirements, nonprofit size, growth, going concern risk,
and audit firm as predictor variables, with internal control infraction as the dependent
variable. The results indicated that growth, going concern risk, and audit firm were
significant predictors of internal control infraction (R2 = .36, n = 44,353, p < .01);
however, the coefficient on nonprofit size was significantly negative. Likewise, Arshad et
al. (2013) used multiple linear regression to examine the relationship between nonprofit
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size and the level of internal control infraction in 234 cultural, religious, and public
service nonprofit organizations. The results indicated nonprofit size does not have a
significantly positive relationship with internal control infraction (β = 0.039, p < .001).
However, Keating et al. (2005) provided evidence that smaller organizations had a
significantly higher level of internal control infraction, and firm size was a significant
predictor of internal control infraction in nonprofit organizations, 2(1, N = 506) = 30.4, p
< .01. Carslaw et al. (2012) concluded smaller and high-risk nonprofits (i.e., those with
less than $1 million in revenue and those with multiple federal programs and complex
requirements) tend to receive mixed opinions, that is, unmodified and modified opinions.
An unmodified opinion assures the fair presentation of the financial statements of an
organization and that the financial statements, taken as a whole, do not include material
misstatements. A modified opinion does not provide this assurance. Arshad et al.,
Carslaw et al., and Petrovits et al. provided mixed evidence about the relationship
between nonprofit size and internal control infraction. The mixed evidence of these
studies was the motivation for including the nonprofit size variable in this study.
With regard to the compliance burden of nonprofit organizations, Baapogmah et
al. (2015), Cordery (2013), Jones and Webber (2012), and Petrovits et al. (2011) found
the burden of government compliance requirements to be significant, especially on small
nonprofit organizations. The manifestation of this burden occurs through paperwork
burdens, short reporting periods, and costly personnel and technology needs. Using a
qualitative phenomenological study, Baapogmah et al. noted the lack of sufficient
resources contributed to the compliance burden of small nonprofits. Jones and Webber
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examined an experiment and noted some compliance requirements are inflexible and
complex. The findings of these studies did not indicate the reason for the compliance
burden of nonprofit organizations was the size of the entities rather than the lack of
sufficient resources and the inflexibility and complexity of government compliance
requirements. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between
nonprofit size and internal control infraction and extend the literature about this
relationship.
Nonprofit type. Researchers found a relationship between nonprofit type and
internal control infraction. Baapogmah et al. (2015) suggested accountability in nonprofit
organizations depends on the context of the relationship and the type of nonprofit
organization involved. For example, leaders of service organizations are accountable to
funders, sector regulators, and clients (the principals) by using mechanisms such as
reports and evaluations. However, the leaders of a network organization who seek policy
change are accountable to their members (the principals) and use mechanisms such as
lobbying and fact-finding. Keating et al. (2005) used a chi-square test of association to
assess the association between nonprofit type and material internal control infraction. The
results indicated nonprofit type was a significant predictor of internal control infraction in
nonprofit organizations, 2(1, N = 506) = 30.4, p < .01. Jones and Webber (2012) also
found nonprofit type to be a significant predictor of internal control infraction. These
findings supported the proposition in this study that a relationship would exist between
nonprofit type and internal control infraction.
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Single audit stakeholders have raised concerns about the complexity, costs, and
relative benefits of the single audit compliance requirements for different types of
nonprofit organizations. Jones and Webber (2012) experimented with nonprofit
organizations whose staff members provide social, education, housing, health, and
economic development services, in which it was straightforward to measure performance.
Jones and Webber concluded these nonprofit types were more likely to meet compliance
requirements. However, organizations whose staff members provide health services that
require complex processes to monitor and account for the transactions were more likely
to fail to meet compliance requirements. Relative to the nature of the services, nonprofits
whose staff members provide health services have more compliance requirements than
social and cultural services organizations because of the medical implications involved
(Jones & Webber, 2012). The federal compliance requirements for health services
nonprofits tended to be more complex as well. Jones and Webber (2012) also provided
evidence that compliance costs affect smaller organizations disproportionately. However,
Jones and Webber’s experiment included only three nonprofit organizations and resulted
in inconclusive findings that limited the credibility of the results. Judging the results
should therefore entail caution.
Internal control infraction. Internal control is deemed effective when there are
no material weaknesses in internal control (Office of Management and Budget, 2015).
Material weakness, as defined in accounting and auditing standards, is a deficiency or a
combination of deficiencies in internal control, such that there is a reasonable possibility
that fraud may occur or a material misstatement of the entity’s financial statements will
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not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a timely basis. A requirement included in
the Federal Single Audit Act of 1984 is reporting internal control infraction to the Federal
Audit Clearinghouse for organizations expending $750,000 or more of federal funds as
part of their annual single audit reports. This requirement is to enhance disclosure of
information, transparency, and financial and operational efficiencies to result in better
services to beneficiaries and the public. Failure to report to the Federal Audit
Clearinghouse will most likely result in a loss of federal funding in the future. Nonprofit
organizations expending less than $750,000 of federal funds do not have to undergo
audits under the Federal Single Audit Act of 1984 or report to the Federal Audit
Clearinghouse but must have an audit under the Generally Accepted Government
Auditing Standards. In this study, the proxies for internal control infraction are reportable
conditions for financial reporting, reportable conditions for compliance, material
weaknesses in financial reporting, material weaknesses for compliance, material
noncompliance, and questioned costs. The existence of a high level of internal control
infraction in organizations can result in potential negative consequences.
The potential consequences for publicly traded companies experiencing a high
level of internal control infraction differ from the consequences for nonprofit
organizations (Rice, Weber, & Wu, 2014). Understanding the potential consequences for
both types of organizations is important because internal control infraction in publicly
traded companies increases the likelihood of class action lawsuits by investors, sanctions
from the Securities and Exchange Commission for an accounting-related infraction, and
management turnover. However, nonprofit organizations are different. Rice et al.
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examined penalties that could serve as an enforcement mechanism for SOX Section 404
and focused on firms with restatements related to internal control infraction. Using a
sample of 1,007 firms, Rice et al. found no evidence that penalties are more likely for
firms, managers, and auditors who failed to report the existence of internal control
infraction. Rice et al. reported that 10% of firms in the sample faced litigation resulting
from their restatement. Rice et al. also noted that 7% of the firms in the sample
experienced sanctions by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The predictor
variables of interest in the study by Rice et al. were litigation and Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
which are sanctions for accounting-related infractions. The dependent variable was
internal control infraction. The results of the AAER regression showed the estimated
coefficient on internal control infraction is positive and statistically significant (R2 = .245,
n = 1,007, p < .10). The marginal effect of internal control infraction indicated that 3-5%
of firms reporting internal control infraction are more likely to receive an AAER
following a restatement of their financial statements. The results of the litigation
regression showed the estimated coefficient on internal control infraction is positive and
statistically significant (R2 = .258, n = 1,007, p < .10). The findings of this study
indicated that firms reporting internal control infraction before their restatements were
more likely to face litigation. Despite extensive research on internal control infraction in
publicly traded companies, there are few studies of internal control infraction in nonprofit
organizations. The intent of this study was to extend the literature on internal control
infraction in nonprofit organizations.
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In nonprofit organizations, the potential consequences are inefficient financial and
operational processes leading to errors in financial reporting and fraud, a loss of funding,
a lack of achievement of economic and social objectives, and insolvency (Petrovits et al.,
2011). Carslaw et al. (2012) suggested there were few regulatory consequences for
nonprofit organizations reporting material internal control infraction or failing to
remediate known infractions. Existing literature on the consequences of a high level of
internal control infraction in organizations included the assumption that agents
considered the expected costs and benefits when deciding whether to comply with SOX
for publicly traded companies and the Federal Single Audit Act of 1984 requirements for
organizations expending federal funds (Basile, Handy, & Fret, 2015). Although the
consequences of a high level of internal control infraction differ between publicly traded
companies and nonprofit organizations, the possible outcome can be insolvency for both
types of organizations.
Despite increased attention to internal control in nonprofit organizations and
nonprofit business leaders’ accountability by government agencies and academics,
nonprofit organizations continue to have weaknesses in their internal control (Petrovits et
al., 2011). Duh, Chen, Lin, and Kuo (2014) suggested a high level of internal control
infraction in nonprofit organizations has resulted in negative financial and operational
consequences for organizations. Understanding the relationship between various
variables and internal control infraction in nonprofits is important to the sustainability of
the nonprofit industry. Concerns about the viability of nonprofit organizations to continue
as going concern entities and their ability to achieve their social and business goals
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served as motivation for this study. As such, it is important to understand the relationship
between the independent variables and the dependent variable of this study, that is,
federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, ,
and internal control infraction.
Internal Control Framework and Federal Laws Related to Internal Control
The updated COSO Framework and internal control. In 1985, the leaders of a
coalition of accounting organizations in the United States formed COSO (Provasi &
Riva, 2015). The mandate of the commission was to examine the reasons for the incidents
of fraud in the financial activities of firms and to make recommendations organizational
leaders could use to develop and maintain internal control systems that mitigate risks to
an acceptable level and provide reliable information supporting sound business decisions
(McNally, 2013). In 1992, COSO leaders issued the COSO Internal Control–Integrated
Framework. The framework included the definition of internal control, five components
of internal control (i.e., control environment, risk assessment, control activities,
information and communication, and monitoring), and three objectives of internal
control: operations, reporting, and compliance (COSO, 2013; Länsiluoto, Jokipii, &
Eklund, 2016; McNally, 2013; Provasi & Riva, 2015). Professionals in management,
accounting, and auditing, as well as government regulators, use the COSO Framework
for developing, implementing, and monitoring internal control in organizations and
accountability by their leaders.
The COSO Framework includes a definition of internal control as a process
developed, implemented, and maintained by an organization’s board of directors,
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management, and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
achievement of operating, reporting, and compliance objectives (COSO, 2013; McNally,
2013). Organizational leaders and auditors widely acknowledge the COSO Framework as
the definitive standard for developing and maintaining an effective and efficient internal
control system (McNally, 2013). In recognition of technological and business
developments and increased business risks, COSO leaders released revisions and updates
to the 1992 COSO Internal Control–Integrated Framework on May 14, 2013 (McNally,
2013; Provasi & Riva, 2015). The release codified existing principles and expanded
guidance on nonfinancial reporting but retained the core definition of internal control and
the five components of a system of internal control (COSO, 2013; Provasi & Riva, 2015).
The conclusion by management and regulators was if the three COSO control objectives
and the five components are not present and functioning, as well as operating together,
then there is a material internal control deficiency (Leng & Zhang, 2014; McNally,
2013). An understanding of the definition, components, and objectives of internal control
by leaders of nonprofit organizations enables the achievement of operating, reporting,
and compliance objectives.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and internal control. In 2002, members of the
U.S. Congress enacted SOX, also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act and the Corporate and Auditing Accountability and
Responsibility Act, to set governance and auditing standards for all publicly traded
companies in the United States (Petrovits et al., 2011; U.S. Government Accountability
Office, 2013). Requirements of the SOX included creating a quasi-public institution, the
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Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, to oversee and regulate audits of publicly
traded companies and to enlist auditors in enforcing existing laws against theft and fraud
(Coates & Srinivasan, 2014). The enactment of SOX resulted in increased monitoring of
publicly traded companies’ internal control system and their leaders’ level of
accountability.
Sections 302 and 404 of SOX mandate the CEOs and CFOs of publicly traded
companies certify the effectiveness and efficiency of the internal control of their
companies. Section 404 also includes a mandate for auditors to attest to the effectiveness
of internal control (Cheung, 2014; Clinton, Pinello, & Skaife, 2014; Coates & Srinivasan,
2014; Myllymäki, 2013; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013). The mandates
of SOX have increased the monitoring of the effectiveness and efficiency of publicly
traded companies’ internal control.
Although SOX is not binding on nonprofit organizations, many nonprofit business
leaders have adopted various provisions of the act. Prior research findings on the effects
of the adoption of some provisions of SOX on nonprofit organizations included evidence
that nonprofits experienced effects in proportion to the level of adoption (Turbide &
Laurin, 2014). Leaders of approximately 25% of nonprofits studied attributed the benefits
of better financial controls and reduced risks of accounting fraud to the adoption of SOX
provisions (Yazawa, 2015). The adoption of the mandates of SOX by nonprofit business
leaders and auditors resulted in a lower level of internal control infraction in nonprofit
organizations.
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Discussions of the appropriateness and the effectiveness of the SOX regulations
to ensure accountability continue in academia, as well as in the political arena. Supporters
of regulations insist regulations are necessary to maintain accountability and more
regulations are necessary to improve accountability. Opponents contend there are too
many regulations and regulations are not necessary to prevent a high level of internal
control infraction and ensure accountability (Coates & Srinivasan, 2014; Feng et al.,
2014; Petrovits et al., 2011; Yazawa, 2015). Most managers believed Section 404 of SOX
improved the quality of financial reporting but did not believe the regulations improved
the efficiency of firms’ operations (Alexander, Bauguess, Bernile, Lee, & MariettaWestberg, 2013; Yazawa, 2015). Their findings of the effectiveness of SOX regulations
on nonprofit organizations’ internal control infraction and accountability by their leaders
is debatable; however, the focus by nonprofit business leaders and auditors on internal
control because of the Federal Single Audit Act of 1984 requirements was a major part of
the examination in this study.
The Federal Single Audit Act of 1984 and internal control. Tandem
procedures outlined in OMB Circular A-133 Compliance Supplement 2015 are on the
disclosure of material weaknesses that indicate significant deficiencies in internal control
and on conducting substantive testing regarding major program compliance with the
unique requirements of particular grant programs. Monitoring organizations whose
leaders expend $750,000 or more of federal funds, by the Federal Audit Clearinghouse
and other regulators, does not necessarily lead to acceptable measures of success. Keating
et al. (2005) suggested this is due in part to the types of nonprofits and the differences in
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the financial and program compliance requirements by cognizant agencies. Despite the
differences, leaders of nonprofits consider the evidence of the measure of success
resulting from monitoring mixed. The focus of audit procedures outlined in OMB
Circular A-133 resulted in identifying material deficiencies in the internal control of
nonprofit organizations, thereby providing motivation for this study.
Transition
Based on an understanding of the relationship between federal compliance
requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control
infraction and the effect of agency theory on these variables, the leaders of nonprofit
organizations will be able to focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of internal control.
This should lead to a decrease in noncompliance with federal program compliance
requirement and an increase in productivity and the satisfaction of beneficiaries of goods
and services. To achieve a low level of internal control infraction, nonprofit business
leaders should understand the relationship between federal compliance requirement,
executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction.
Carslaw et al. (2012) and Saat et al. (2013) suggested small organizations had a
higher level of internal control infraction than large organizations. However, Saat et al.
demonstrated that the complexities of financial and program characteristics result in a
high level of internal control infraction in small nonprofit organizations. Hence,
additional study of the relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive
compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction in nonprofit
organizations was necessary.
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This study included an analysis and synthesis of the independent and dependent
variables. Arshad et al. (2013), O’Brien and Tooley (2013), and Saat et al. (2013)
examined the effect of variables on nonprofit accountability and provided evidence that a
relationship existed between some variables and accountability by leaders of nonprofit
organizations. The focus of this study was on the variables that may relate to internal
control infraction in nonprofit organizations.
The review of the literature covered some variables related to internal control
infraction in nonprofits and the effect of agency theory on the variables. Section 1
established the foundation for this study. Section 2 expands the discussion of the problem
statement, purpose statement, research method and design, data collection, and data
analysis.
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Section 2: The Project
This section begins with a restatement of the purpose statement, followed by a
description of the role of the researcher in the data collection process and participants in
the study. Descriptions of the research method, design, and justification for the
methodology and design chosen also appear in this section. Other areas of the study
discussed are the population, sampling technique, and data collection and analysis
techniques. This section ends with a discussion of the measures undertaken to ensure the
validity and reliability of findings.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between the independent variables (i.e., federal compliance requirement,
executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type), and the dependent variable (i.e.,
internal control infraction). The targeted population was archival data records from
nonprofit social services organizations, schools, institutions of higher learning, housing
organizations, and hospitals in the southeast region of the United States. The implications
for positive social change include the potential for nonprofit boards of directors and
executives to increase their awareness of nonprofit business leaders’ social responsibility
to beneficiaries. The increase in awareness of nonprofit business leaders should bring
about positive social change in their behavior. Nonprofit business leaders can improve
operational efficiencies in the provision of social, education, housing, health, and
economic development services to those in society and communities who need them the
most.
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Role of the Researcher
The basic ethical principles that underlie the conduct of research involving human
subjects are intended to ensure the ethical performance of research and the protection of
human subjects’ rights is guaranteed (Brakewood & Poldrack, 2013; Moulton, Collins,
Burns-Cox, & Coulter, 2013). The role of the researcher in a quantitative study involves
collecting, organizing, and ethically analyzing data. My role in this quantitative study
was to ensure adherence to the ethical principles and guidelines in the Belmont Report.
As a public accountant engaged in nonprofit auditing, I am familiar with the
internal control systems of nonprofit organizations, regulations related to internal control
systems, and internal control infraction experienced by nonprofit organizations. Over the
past two decades, I have observed relatively few improvements in the level of internal
control and nonprofit business leaders’ accountability. Identifying the relationship
between variables and internal control infraction in nonprofits is important to nonprofit
business leaders achieving their social responsibilities and to auditors achieving the
objectives of the audits.
The researchers’ role as related to three basic ethical principles relevant to the
ethics of research involving human subjects is described in the Belmont Report
(Brakewood, & Poldrack, 2013; Moulton, Collins, Burns-Cox, & Coulter, 2013). The
principles are respect of persons, beneficence, and justice. Respect for persons
incorporates the convictions that the treatment of individuals should be as autonomous
agents and that persons with diminished autonomy should receive protection.
Beneficence requires persons to receive ethical treatment from researchers who should
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respect their decisions and protect them from harm. Justice relates to who should benefit
from research and who should bear the burdens.
As a researcher, I abided by all ethical principles of the Belmont Report and
avoided bias. In this study, I used archival data from U.S. government sources in the
public domain. Although this research did not involve human participants, the study
proceeded in an ethical manner. I also obtained permission from Walden University
Institutional Review Board (IRB) before collecting data.
Participants
Departments of the federal government are the most frequent cognizant agencies
of nonprofit social services organizations, schools, institutions of higher learning,
housing organizations, and hospitals whose leaders expend federal funds. Nonprofits in
the southeast region of the United States receiving funding from federal government
departments and expending federal funds equal to and exceeding $750,000 must have an
annual federal single audit. These nonprofits comprised the targeted population of this
research. Nonprofits whose leaders expend federal funds must meet the compliance
requirements of the federal agencies providing the majority of their funds.
This study involved collecting secondary data from the Federal Audit
Clearinghouse for five categories of nonprofit organizations: nonprofit social services
organizations, schools, institutions of higher learning, housing organizations, and
hospitals operating in the southeast region of the United States. This study also involved
downloading public information directly from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse. The
compliance requirements of federal agencies for each category of nonprofit organization
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differ by the numbers of requirements; therefore, compliance complexities vary (see
Table 1).
Table 1
Compliance Requirements
Oversight
Maximum number
agencies
of compliance
% of
identification
requirements for compliance
numbers
Names of federal agencies
each federal agency requirements
14
Department of Housing and Urban
14
9.7
Development
16
Department of Justice
9
6.2
84
Department of Education
11
7.6
93
Department of Health and Human
12
8.3
Services
97
Department of Homeland Security
12
8.3
98
United States Agency for
9
6.2
International Development
10
United States Department of
12
8.3
Agriculture
12
Department of Defense
11
7.6
17
Department of Labor
12
8.3
20
Department of Transportation
14
9.7
81
Department of Energy
12
8.3
94
Corporation for National and
10
6.7
Community Service
96
Social Security
7
4.8
Total
145
100.0
Note. The source of information included in this table was OMB Circular A-133
Compliance Supplement 2015. The maximum number of compliance requirements for
each agency in Table 1 represents the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, which is a
government-wide compendium of federal programs, projects, services, and activities that
provide assistance.
Research Method and Design
Research Method
The quantitative research method was the methodology used in this study. The
three primary methods used in scientific research are quantitative, qualitative, and mixed
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methods. The quantitative research method is an objective and systematic process
involving the use of numerical data to measure phenomena and produce findings
(Bentahar & Cameron, 2015). According to Bentahar and Cameron (2015), researchers
using the quantitative research methodology test theories from existing knowledge by
developing a hypothesized relationship between measurable variables to attain additional
knowledge. Furthermore, researchers using the quantitative methodology assume there is
only one true and objective reality, that is, independence of social perception and
variables included in statistical analyses are well represented (Babones, 2015). According
to Phoenix et al. (2013), the basis for the quantitative philosophical and theoretical
framework is positivism. Thus, within the positivist paradigm, the quantitative
methodology is more acceptable than the qualitative method.
A fundamental consideration in posing and answering research questions is the
researcher’s worldview, the philosophy a researcher has about the world, and the nature
of research. A worldview described by Babones (2015) and Phoenix et al. (2013) is
positivism in which causes determine outcomes, reduce ideas into a small discrete set of
ideas to obtain and test data, and use a quantitative research method starting with a theory
to examine the relationship between variables. Starting with agency theory, this study
involved examining the relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive
compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction. Based on the
nature of this study, the appropriate research methodology was the quantitative method.
The research community acknowledges the description of a research methodology
as the procedural strategies adapted to investigate the phenomenon under study and as the
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strategy of investigation (Knight & Cross, 2012). Qualitative research is a systematic
inquiry concerned with understanding social beings and the nature of their interaction
with themselves and their surroundings. Furthermore, the qualitative research method
involves developing theory inductively (Garcia & Gluesing, 2013). The intent of
qualitative researchers is not to quantify findings but to describe findings in the language
employed in the research process. Qualitative research methodology is appropriate for
testing phenomena with lived experiences and the perceptions of interviewees and was
therefore not appropriate for this study.
The mixed methods approach includes both the quantitative and qualitative
research methodologies. The quantitative and qualitative methods involve a focus on
different dimensions of the same phenomenon and are appropriate for gaining insights
and results, for making inferences, and for drawing conclusions (Bentahar & Cameron,
2015). Researchers using the mixed methods approach point out the shortcomings of the
qualitative and quantitative methods in isolation when seeking to understand complex
social issues. For example, the mixed methods approach involves more extensive data
collection and analyses of textual and numerical data and is time-consuming and costintensive (Bentahar & Cameron, 2015). Because of the exclusion of the qualitative
research method from this study and time limitation, the mixed methods approach was
not appropriate for this study.
Research Design
This study included a correlation research design. The research design is the
specific techniques employed to collect and analyze data (Knight & Cross, 2012). The

52
designs used in quantitative research are correlational, experimental, and
nonexperimental. The correlational design involves examining the relationship between
independent variables and the dependent variable (Farelly, 2013; Jerejian et al., 2013).
This quantitative correlational study involved examining the relationship between federal
compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and
internal control infraction to assess the significance of the relationship between the
independent variables and the dependent variable. Curtis et al. (2015) noted that
measuring the effect of an intervention on an outcome is characteristic of the
experimental design. Also, the manipulation of variables occurs in the experimental
design to ensure the random assignment of the sample units. However, the manipulation
of variables does not occur in correlational or nonexperimental designs.
Correlation does not necessarily imply causality, as there is no random
assignment, and thus it is impossible to ascribe causal effects to the independent variables
of interest (Omair, 2015). Correlational design can involve using secondary data for two
or more variables to determine an association between the variables, as occurred in this
study. Correlational studies are usually quick and inexpensive to complete, as secondary
data are readily available from many different sources (Omair, 2015). A correlational
design was appropriate for this study, as the purpose was to determine the relationship
between independent and dependent variables.
Population and Sampling
The targeted population of this study included nonprofit social services
organizations, schools, institutions of higher learning, housing organizations, and
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hospitals whose leaders expend federal funds and operate in the southeast region of the
United States. The targeted population excluded archival data records from governmentdependent organizations such as community service boards and economic development
boards. Because the leaders of the nonprofits included in the targeted population
expended $750,000 or more of federal funds, the organizations were subject to federal
compliance requirements. They were also subject to annual federal single audits, which
require the identification of internal control infraction in nonprofit organizations. The
identification of internal control infraction during federal single audits helped align the
sample selected for this study with the overarching research question.
I used a probabilistic sampling strategy. According to Uprichard (2013),
probability sampling necessitates that knowledge of all possible units to sample is
available, which was the case for this study. The probabilistic sampling strategy enables
deductive reasoning; thus, an assumption exists that there is a specified distribution of the
population values (Uprichard, 2013). However, some weaknesses for this sampling
approach are that this method is tedious and time-consuming, especially when creating
larger samples (Uprichard, 2013).
Quantitative research involves simple random sample selection from the study
population to generalize the findings to the larger population. The random selection of
sample units, which was the selection process for this research, increases the credibility
of inferences drawn about the relationship between variables and enables the
generalization of research findings to the population from which the sample comes
(Hudson & Llosa, 2015). A simple random sample was suitable for this study because of
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the sampling frame; that is, a complete list of all available records was available. I
selected a simple random sample using Excel after I eliminated incomplete and duplicate
data and standardized the spelling of the names of nonprofits from the population of
nonprofit organizations’ single audits. The reason for selecting this sampling method was
the availability of data, its use in previous studies, and the validity and reliability of the
findings of those studies. This type of selection aligns with sampling without
replacement.
In sampling without replacement, each sample unit of the population has only one
chance for selection in the sample. The advantages of sampling without replacement are
it leads to an estimator of the population total having a smaller variance than obtained by
sampling with replacement, it is simple to calculate, and there is a possibility of
estimating the variance of the estimator exactly (Rao, Hartley, & Cochran, 1962). The
disadvantages of sampling without replacement are it is applicable only under severe
restrictions on prescribed probabilities and unbiased procedures and, it requires a
cumbersome evaluation of working probabilities (Rao et al., 1962). Any attempt to avoid
these disadvantages is at the expense of a loss in efficiency.
The Federal Audit Clearinghouse database is the source of information collected
from auditors performing annual federal single audits. The database includes all the
variables needed to test their relationship. The calendar year 2015 was the last year
summary data were available and was, therefore, most appropriate for this study. I
manually collected financial data from the Form 990 tax returns of nonprofits using
Guidestar.org.
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G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) was the statistical software
package selected to conduct an a priori sample size analysis. A power analysis using
G*Power Version 3.19 helped to determine the appropriate sample size for this study. An
a priori power analysis, assuming a medium effect size (f =.15), a = .05, and four
predictor variables, identified that a minimum sample size of 103 nonprofits was
necessary to achieve a power of .80. Increasing the sample size to 153 increased power to
.95. Therefore, I sought between 103 and 153 nonprofits for the study (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Power as a function of sample size.
The use of a medium effect size (f =.15) was appropriate for this study. The
analysis of two articles for which internal control infraction is the outcome measurement
was the basis for using a medium effect size.
Ethical Research
Walden University requires the approval of a doctoral study proposal from the
university’s IRB before conducting a study and requires the final doctoral manuscript
include the Walden IRB approval number (see Appendix A). Before approval of the
proposal, the IRB ensures compliance with applicable laws and institutional regulations
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and standards for professional conduct and practices in research (Goldenberg et al.,
2015). Irrespective of the research methodology, a researcher should anticipate ethical
dilemmas during the research and protect human participants from risks, as documented
in the Belmont Report and required by IRB regulations (Moulton, Collins, Burns-Cox, &
Coulter, 2013; Van Amstel, 2013). This study did not include human participants, as the
data required were publicly available; therefore, consent forms, confidentiality
agreements, and letters of cooperation were not necessary. I stored all data in a protected
electronic file to which I was the only person with access, and I will delete the data 5
years following the completion of the study.
Data Collection Instruments
Research requires an instrumentation plan consisting of decisions related to
how to gather data, when to gather data, where to gather data, and how to analyze data
(Hagan, 2014). For this quantitative correlational research, the primary data in the
Federal Audit Clearinghouse database came from auditors performing federal single
audits. This study included archival data from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse to
determine the relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive
compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction. The
manually collected executive compensation data came from the Form 990 tax returns of
nonprofits using the Guidestar.org website.
Scales of Measurement
The Federal Audit Clearinghouse database included the following variables:
federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type,
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and internal control infraction. The predictor variables, which were federal compliance
requirement, executive compensation, and nonprofit size, had a ratio scale of
measurement. A ratio scale of measurement consists of ordered categories with the
additional requirement that the categories form a series of intervals that are all the same
size (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2013). Because the intervals are the same size, it is possible to
determine both the size and the direction of the difference between the measurements.
The predictor variable, nonprofit type, is a nominal scale of measurement. A
nominal scale of measurement involves classifying individuals or events into categories
that have different names (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2013). The measurements from a
nominal scale can indicate two individuals or events are different but do not identify
either the direction or the size of the difference. The nonprofit type variable has five
categories: social service organizations, schools, institutions of higher learning, housing
organizations, and hospitals. Therefore, the study included a reference variable and four
dummy variables to allow for analysis using multiple regression. Table 2 depicts an
example of the coding of dummy variables using institutions of higher learning as the
reference group.
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Table 2
Example of Coding of Nonprofit Type Dummy Variables
Federal
compliance
Executive Nonprofit
requirement compensation
size
Schools

Housing

Nonprofit
social
services

Hospitals

X

X

X

1

0

0

0

X

X

X

0

1

0

0

X

X

X

0

0

1

0

X
X
X
0
0
0
1
Note. The measurement of federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, and
nonprofit size is at the ratio level. Institutions of higher learning is the reference variable
and the other four variables (i.e., schools, institutions of higher learning, hospitals, and
nonprofit social services organizations) are dummy variables.
Description of the Data
Federal compliance requirement. The predictor variable, federal compliance
requirement, was a ratio scale of measurement. The value of federal compliance
requirement represented 14 categories of compliance activities. The 14 categories were
allowed or unallowed activities, allowable costs, cash management, eligibility, equipment
and real property management, matching level of effort, period of availability of federal
funds, procurement and supervision, program income, real property acquisition,
reporting, subrecipient monitoring, and special tests and provisions. This study included
the numbers of compliance requirements (i.e., the numbers of categories) and the
percentages of the total compliance requirements for the federal agencies providing
funding to nonprofit organizations included in the sample. Table 1 showed the maximum
number of compliance requirements and percentages of compliance requirements for
each federal agency. The percentage of compliance requirements for each nonprofit
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organization, based on the federal agencies providing funding, represented the federal
compliance requirement score. Higher scores for the federal compliance requirement
variable indicated a higher number of compliance requirements for nonprofit
organizations and higher levels of internal control infraction expected during the single
audits of nonprofits.
Executive compensation. The predictor variable, executive compensation, was a
ratio scale of measurement. The basis for executive compensation was total compensation
(salary and health insurance and retirement benefits) paid to financial or nonfinancial
executives of the nonprofit as a percentage of revenue.
Nonprofit size. The predictor variable, nonprofit size, was a ratio scale of
measurement. The basis for nonprofit size was the actual revenue of the nonprofit
organization measured by the dollar value, and higher dollar values indicated larger
organizations.
Nonprofit type. The predictor variable, nonprofit type, was a nominal scale of
measurement. The nonprofit type variable had five categories: (a) institutions of higher
learning, (b) schools, (c) housing organizations, (d) social service organizations, and (e)
hospitals.
Internal control infraction. The dependent variable, internal control infraction,
was a ratio scale of measurement. An internal control infraction was any reportable
conditions in internal controls identified during the single audit. If during the
performance of a single audit, an auditor found that the nonprofit organization did not
comply with laws and regulations, the internal controls were deficient, or a situation of
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illegal acts or fraud, the auditor must report such situations as reportable conditions,
material weaknesses, material noncompliance, and questioned costs to the Federal Audit
Clearinghouse. Questioned costs are expenditures that auditors determined were not
permissable, and returning the funds for these costs to the federal government is
necessary. The severity of the internal control infraction variable was a weighted measure
based on the four categories identified during the federal single audits: reportable
conditions, material weaknesses, material noncompliance, and questioned costs.
Following the methodology used in the research by Petrovits et al. (2011), the basis for
determining weights for the four categories was the levels of severity of internal control
infraction outlined in the Federal Audit Clearinghouse database. To determine the
internal control infraction score based on the assigned weights for infractions in this
study, the least severe internal control infraction received a value of 1, and the most
severe received a value of 11. The weights for each category of internal control infraction
appear in Table 3. The expansion of the assigned weights from the three levels of severity
in Petrovits et al.’s study to six levels in this study occurred on the basis of the feedback
from a panel of 10 certified public accountants who were experts in federal single audits.
A high internal control score, based on the weight for internal control infraction,
indicated a low level of internal control, and a low internal control score indicated a high
level of internal control. Based on the categories of internal control infraction and the
weights assigned to the level of severity, the determination of a composite score for each
nonprofit organization occurred.
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Table 3
Quality Control Review Coding and Weights for Noncompliance
Types of noncompliance
Assigned weight a
Reportable conditions—financial reporting
1
Reportable conditions—compliance
3
Material weaknesses—financial reporting
5
Material weaknesses—compliance
7
Material noncompliance
9
Questioned costs
11
a
Source of weights is the Federal Audit Clearinghouse, where 11 = most severe internal
control infraction and 1 = least severe internal control infraction.
Strategies to Address Validity and Reliability
The establishment of external validity in this study involved the inclusion of all
nonprofits in the southeast region of the United States reporting to the Federal Audit
Clearinghouse in the population from which I selected the sample. A power analysis
using G*Power Version 3.19 helped to determine the appropriate sample size. The
strategy to address reliability was to identify methods for dealing with missing and
incomplete data and standardize the spelling of the names of nonprofit organizations.
Data Collection Technique
The secondary data for this study came from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse
website. The Federal Audit Clearinghouse database contains archival data records.
Archival data are data previously collected by a person other than the researcher using the
data Feng et al., 2014). According to Feng et al. (2014), there are several advantages to
using archival data. For example, archival data files (a) contain financial and nonfinancial
variables for a sample, (b) include a division of data in some archival files by location, (c)
are searchable using a large number of keywords, (d) are downloadable into other
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software, (e) are publicly available and easily accessible, and (f) are sometimes available
at no cost. Feng et al. also described several disadvantages to using archival data. For
example, archival data (a) may include preparation errors that affect the reliability of the
data, (b) may include mathematical errors, (c) may be incomplete because some
organizations need not report their information due to size bias, and (d) may not have a
user-friendly format.
According to federal compliance regulations, leaders of nonprofits must comply
with the Matrix of Federal Single Audit Compliance Supplements for cognizant federal
agencies (see Appendix A). As performed by Harris et al. (2014), the collection and
combination of Single Audit Act data with financial data from the IRS Form 990
obtained through Guidestar.org was one step in this study. Researchers (e.g., Hou et al.,
2014; Kobelsky et al., 2013) frequently collect executive compensation information for
nonprofit organizations from IRS Form 990. The data collected came from the Federal
Audit Clearinghouse and Guidestar.org.
The secondary data for this study came from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse
website. Leaders of nonprofit organizations who expend $750,000 or more of federal
funds must submit their audited single audit reports to the Federal Audit Clearinghouse
annually. The data collected from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse database included
audit year, type of entity, fiscal year-end of the entity, tax identification number,
auditee name and address, auditee contact, oversight agency, type of financial statement
report issued, type of compliance report issued, type of noncompliance, and severity of
noncompliance identified during the audit. The data from the Federal Audit
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Clearinghouse also included the level of internal control infraction (i.e., the number and
severity of infraction in internal control identified in the single audits of nonprofit
organizations). I downloaded the data collected from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse
in Excel format and processed the data using SPSS. The data collected from the Federal
Audit Clearinghouse comprised the independent and dependent variables included in
the regression model of this study.
The manually collected financial information came from nonprofit
organizations’ tax returns (i.e., Form 990 tax returns) on the Guidestar.org website.
Using the tax identification numbers for each nonprofit organization, I located the Form
990 in Guidestar.org and collected the compensation and functional expense data (i.e.,
program, administrative, and fundraising expenses) for input into the Excel file with the
Federal Audit Clearinghouse data. The combination of data from the Federal Audit
Clearinghouse with executive compensation and functional expenses manually
collected from IRS Form 990 completed the data required for this study.
Data Analysis
This study involved an attempt to answer the following research question: What is
the relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation,
nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction? This study involved testing
the following hypotheses to find answers to the research question:
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between federal compliance
requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control
infraction.
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Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between federal compliance
requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control
infraction.
Statistical Analysis
Multiple linear regression is a statistical tool used to examine the relationship
between independent and dependent variables (Nimon & Oswald, 2013). Multiple linear
regression is valuable for quantifying the effect of independent, or explanatory, variables
upon a single dependent variable (Sofowote, Bitzos, & Munoz, 2014). Researchers use
multiple linear regression analysis to cope with a large number of explanatory variables
(Nimon & Oswald, 2013). Because omitted bias is possible in a simple regression,
multiple linear regression is essential, even when a researcher only wants to determine
the effects of one independent variable (Nimon & Oswald, 2013).
Like multiple linear regression, logistic regression involves using one or more
exploratory variable that may be either continuous or categorical. Unlike multiple linear
regression, researchers use logistic regression to predict binary dependent variables rather
than a continuous outcome (Agras et al., 2014). Given this difference, a violation of the
assumptions of multiple linear regression occurs, which made this statistical tool
unsuitable for this study.
Other predictive techniques considered included discriminant analysis and
hierarchical linear regression. Discriminant analysis is similar to regular multiple
regression except the dependent (Y) variable is binary (that is, 0 or 1) instead of
continuous. The main purpose of discriminant analysis is to predict group membership
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based on a linear combination of the interval variables (Rodionova, Titova, &
Pomerantsev, 2016). Discriminant analysis also helps to gain an understanding of the data
set, as an examination of the predicted model gives insight into the relationship between
group membership and the variables used to predict group membership (Zhong & Zhang,
2013). Because the purpose of this study was not to test the relationship between group
membership and the variables used to predict group membership, discriminant analysis
was not an appropriate statistical model for this study.
In hierarchical regression, the entry of each variable or group of variables into the
regression equation is in an order determined by the researcher (Nimon & Oswald, 2013).
The order of entry is critical in hierarchical regression, as variables entered early will
appear to be more important than variables entered later. The interpretation of regression
coefficients for each variable may be as the total effect of the variable on the outcome,
even though there may be mediating effects through variables entered later in the
regression. Hierarchical models are particularly appropriate for research designs with
control variables. A disadvantage of hierarchical regression is the apparent importance of
variables depending on the order entered into the equation. Because the entry of all
independent variables in this study occurred at the same time, hierarchical regression was
not appropriate for this study.
Data Cleaning and Missing Data
Data cleaning is the process of identifying inaccurate, incomplete, and
unreasonable data and then modifying or deleting such data to improve data quality
(Dawes, Vidiasova, & Parkhimovich, 2016). As the basis for research conclusions is the
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analysis of data, data should be as complete and accurate as possible (Dawes et al., 2016).
Most data sets contain duplicate, incomplete, and missing values. This research included
the use of archival data records from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse. According to
Dawes et al. (2016) and Wu (2013), government data usually have more than an 80%
quality rating and may not require data cleaning. Therefore, I standardized the spelling of
the names of nonprofit organizations and applied a method of dealing with missing data.
Missing data refer to the absence of data items in a data set (Vaishnav & Patel,
2015). The presence of missing data is one major factor affecting data quality. The
presence of missing data is a common occurrence, and challenging problem arise when
using archival data records (Vaishnav & Patel, 2015). Two methods of dealing with
missing data are listwise deletion and pairwise deletion. Listwise deletion involves
deleting cases containing missing values, that is, the exclusion of an entire record or
entire row from the data set. This method is simple to use but has a high effect on
variability. It also results in a loss of precision and induces bias (Vaishnav & Patel,
2015). Pairwise deletion is the deletion of records only from the column containing the
missing values; that is, researchers delete only missing values. This method is simple to
use, and keeps all available values, but results in a loss of data and may not be a better
solution than other methods. To address missing data in this study, I used the listwise
deletion method and eliminated nonprofit organizations with incomplete and duplicate
data not required for this research.
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Assumptions in Statistical Analyses
All statistical models include assumptions (Casson & Farmer, 2014). The
assumptions in the use of multiple linear regression (Loomis, 2014) are (a)
homoscedasticity, (b) independence of residuals (c) linearity, (d) multicollinearity, (e)
normality, and (f) outliers (Norris, Plonsky, Ross, & Schoonen, 2015). Researchers must
assess these assumptions during research to identify statistical techniques to deal with the
assumptions (Casson & Farmer, 2014). See Table 4 for procedures for testing the
assumptions in the use of multiple linear regression.
Table 4
Assumptions and Procedures for Testing Assumptions for Multiple Linear Regression
Assumptions
Linearity
Homoscedasticity
Multicollinearity
Independence of
residuals
Normality
Outliers

Procedures for testing assumptions
Normal probability plot (P-P) of the regression standardized residual
Normal probability plot (P-P) of the regression standardized residual
Normal probability plot (P-P) of the regression standardized residual
Normal probability plot (P-P) of the regression standardized residual
Normal probability plot (P-P) of the regression standardized residual
Scatterplot

Homoscedasticity. The assumption of homoscedasticity refers to the equal
variance of errors across all levels of independent variables (Garson, 2012). The absence
of this assumption can lead to distortion of the findings and weaken the overall analysis
and statistical power of the analysis, which results in an increased possibility of Type I
error, erratic and untrustworthy F-test results, and erroneous conclusions (Casson &
Farmer, 2014). I assessed for the existence of homoscedasticity by visual examination of
the normal probability plot (P-P) of the regression standardized residual and scatterplot of
the residuals.
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Independence of residuals. Independence of residuals is an assumption for most
statistical procedures, such as multiple regression and logistic regression (Garson, 2012).
Independence of residuals refers to residuals being independent of one another. Residuals
may be plotted against case identification number when the ordering of cases is by time, a
grouping factor, or data collection order potentially causing nonindependence (Garson,
2012). There should be no pattern to this plot if residuals are independent. I assessed the
independence of residuals by a visual inspection of the normal probability plot of the
regression standardized residual and scatterplot of the residuals.
Linearity. Testing for nonlinearity is necessary because correlation and other
general linear models assume linearity (Garson, 2012). According to Garson (2012), a
plot of standardized residuals against standardized estimates (fitted values) of the
dependent variables should show a random pattern when nonlinearity is absent. Another
indicator of possible nonlinearity is when the standard deviation of the residuals exceeds
the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Simple inspection of scatterplot is a
common method of determining if nonlinearity exists in a relationship (Garson, 2012). I
assessed the existence of nonlinearity by a visual inspection of the normal probability
plot of the regression standardized residual and scatterplot of the residuals.
Multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is a condition that exists when there is a high
relationship (e.g., >.80) between two predictor variables (Garson, 2012; Ray‐Mukherjee
et al., 2014). A review of the tolerance and variance inflation factor produced as part of
the SPSS regression output is usually useful for assessing the degree to which
multicollinearity exists among the independent variables (Garson, 2012). Tolerance is an
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indicator of how the other independent variables do not explain the variability of the
specified dependent in the model (Garson, 2012). Variance inflation factor, which is the
inverse of tolerance, suggests multicollinearity if it is above 10. Apart from examining
the variance inflation factors, I also examined a bivariate correlation matrix of the
predictor variables produced by SPSS software for correlation coefficients less than .80.
Normality. To perform statistical hypothesis testing, a test statistic must contain
parameter estimate information that comes from a manageable probability distribution,
which is typically a normal distribution (Azat, 2014; Casson & Farmer, 2014; Loomis,
2014). The manageable probability distribution is the assumption of normality. A normal
distribution takes the form of a symmetric bell-shaped curve, and the standard normal
distribution has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (Garson, 2012). A violation of
this assumption may lead a researcher to inaccurate inferential statements. I assessed
normality by visually examining the normal probability plot of the regression
standardized residual and scatterplot of the residuals.
Outliers. Outlying observations can alter the outcome of analysis and are
violations of normality (Casson & Farmer, 2014). The presence of outliers may be
indicative of bad data. Dropping outliers may be necessary to address these violations;
however, dropping outliers can also bias the research results. As a general principle,
dropping outliers is justified if the data are bad because of the following: (a) out-of-range
entries and discrepant and dishonest entries and (b) researchers do not treat missing
values as real values (Garson, 2012). I assessed for the existence of outliers by
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conducting a visual examination of the normal probability plot of the regression
standardized residual and scatterplot of the residuals.
I employed bootstrapping to address the possible influence of assumption
violations. Bootstrapping is a statistical technique implemented to compute standard
errors of the coefficients for predictor variables and to address the problem of stability in
a random sample directly (Nimon & Oswald, 2013). Bootstrapping is ideal for testing the
significance of the standardized coefficient of the predictor variable (β) because the
sampling distribution of the indirect effect may be nonnormal, particularly in small
samples. In contrast, the prevailing method for testing the indirect effect is to assume that
the distribution is normal (Garson, 2012; Koopman, Howe, Hollenbeck, & Sin, 2015).
According to Koopman et al. (2015), when this assumption is not satisfied, the test tends
to exhibit higher Type II error rates than bootstrapping does.
Interpreting Results
The SPSS output yields various statistics that require interpretation, including R2,
F value, Β, SE B, β, t, and p. The reporting of bootstrap 95% confidence intervals
occurred where appropriate.
R2. R2 is the numerical measure of the variance in the dependent variable
attributed to the predictor variables (Sowinski et al., 2015). R2 can range from 0 to 1,
where higher values mean the independent variables explain more of the variance in the
dependent variable and lower values mean the independent variables explain less of the
variance in the dependent variable. An R2 value of .15 indicates the predictor variable
accounts for 15% of the variance in the dependent variable.
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F. The F ratio of the analysis of variance (i.e., ANOVA), including the nature of
the significance test (sig. or p value), helped to determine if I would accept or reject the
null hypothesis of the research (Norris et al., 2015). The F ratio provides the significance
of the predictor variables (as a group) and, along with the associated p value (sig.), tells if
the model is significant or explained. For a model to be useful, a p value of .05 is
acceptable. This means that the model is correctly specified and that the model can help
to explain the research question (Kühberger, Fritz, Lermer, & Scherndl, 2015).
Β. B is the unstandardized coefficient of the predictor variable (Green & Salkind,
2013). The B value predicts by what factor the value of the dependent variable will
change given a unit change in the predictor variable and assuming other predictor
variables remain constant (Green & Salkind, 2013).
SE B. SE B is the standard error for the unstandardized coefficient of the predictor
variable that shows the degree of irregularity in the data (Green & Salkind, 2013). The
standard error of the estimate is the standard deviation of the error term and the
measurement is the square root of the mean square residual (Von Hippel, 2012).
β. β is the standardized coefficient of the predictor variable and is the slope of the
regression line that mathematically represents the linear regression formula (Green &
Salkind, 2013). β coefficients represent the amount of change associated with a 1-unit
change in each of the independent variables (Sowinski et al., 2015).
t. The t statistic is a measure of the departure of an estimated parameter from its
notional value and its standard error (Liu et al., 2014b). A t statistic is determined when
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the value of a parameter estimate in a regression model is subtracted from the actual
parameter estimate and divided by the standard error.
Sig. (p). The definition of the p value is the probability of obtaining a result equal
to or more extreme than observed when the null hypothesis is true (Li, Yeung, Cherny, &
Sham, 2012). A smaller p value than the significance level α will result in a rejection of
the null hypothesis that a particular coefficient is equal to zero, whereas a p value larger
than the significance level α will result in a failure to reject the null hypothesis, which
indicates that the estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero (Li et al.,
2012).
Statistical Software and Version
I used SPSS Version 21 to analyze and interpret data in this study. According to
Rovai, Baker, and Ponton (2014), SPSS is a widely used program for statistical analysis
in social science, and market researchers, health researchers, survey companies,
government, education researchers, marketing organizations, and data miners use this
software extensively. SPSS is an effective statistical analysis tool used in academic
research to address planning, data collection, analysis, and reporting (Rovai et al., 2014).
Study Validity and Reliability
At an operational level, a research methodology refers to specific methods used to
gather adequate evidence of phenomena, develop appropriate ways to analyze data, and
demonstrate the validity of findings (Knight & Cross, 2012). Validity is central in all
research but even more so for positivist and deductive research (Lameck, 2013). Validity
refers to the degree to which evidence and theory support the conclusions drawn from the
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findings of the research (Fan, 2013). Reliability refers to the consistency of the findings
obtained from the research (Ihantola & Kihn, 2011). Four levels of validity are internal
validity, external validity, construct validity, and reliability. Issues such as Type I and
Type II errors, violated assumptions, misspecification errors, multicollinearity, distorted
graphics, confirmation bias, and causal error are threats to internal and external validity.
Internal Validity
Internal validity indicates variations in the dependent variable resulting from
variations in the independent variable and not from confounding variables (Burchett,
Mayhew, Lavis, & Dobrow, 2013). Thus, the examination of internal validity is only
relevant in studies in which casual relationships exist (i.e., experimental or quasiexperimental designs) and is not relevant to research using a correlational design
(Ihantola & Kihn, 2011). Because this study involved a correlational design, threats to
internal validity were not applicable; however, threats to statistical conclusion validity
were of concern.
External Validity
External validity indicates whether support for conclusions relates to the model
used and data collected and whether findings are generalizable to other samples, time
periods, and settings. External validity relates to probability sampling strategies, that is,
random sampling (Ihantola & Kihn, 2011). Three potential threats to external validity are
population validity, time validity, and environment validity. Population validity refers to
whether the relationship between two variables in a sample also exists in the population.
If the sample size is inadequate or if the sample selection is not random, then estimates
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may be meaningless, as the sample estimates will not reflect the population parameters
(Ihantola & Kihn, 2011). Time validity refers to the possibility of generalizing findings,
at a particular time, to other periods. Environmental validity refers to the generalization
of findings across settings or states.
I used a two-tailed test with alpha less than 5% to guard against making a Type I
error. I only reported results that had less than a 5% likelihood of occurring by chance
alone. As the results obtained in the sample of this study were unlikely to have occurred
by chance, it was reasonable to generalize from the sample to the larger population. A
Type II error occurs when a researcher concludes that a relationship does not exist among
variables when in fact there is a relationship (Yin, 2013). The probability of committing a
Type II error is 1 - α. As proposed by Bradley and Brand (2015), to guard against making
a Type II error, I used a sufficiently large sample. A power analysis using G*Power
Version 3.19 helped determine the appropriate sample size.
Reliability
Reliability refers to the extent that a variable or a set of variables is consistent
with what a researcher intends to measure and others can replicate the research findings
(Lameck, 2013). Reliability refers to the possibility of obtaining the same results by
performing the research examination again. Reliable measures will be consistent with
their values when multiple measures exist (Ihantola & Kihn, 2011). If measurement
results are not reliable, it is difficult to test hypotheses or make inferences about the
relationship between variables in a quantitative model. Potential threats to reliability exist
during data collection when there is a lack of clear and standard instructions.
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The emphasis in this research was formulating hypotheses for subsequent
verification, and the focus was to search for a relationship between the dependent and the
independent variables. The research process in this study resulted in sufficient
information about the relationship between the variables to generalize the findings of the
sample to the population across the southeast region of the United States. Data collected
in this quantitative research were numerical. Producing data in an ordered numerical
system was a strength of this study.
When researchers rigorously collect and analyze data used for quantitative
analyses, the data obtained are reliable (Hewege & Perera, 2013). This research was
reliable because the study included procedures to control or eliminate extraneous
variables and included standardized testing during the assessment of data collected. The
assumptions of the multiple linear regression statistical tests in this study and procedures
for testing the assumptions appeared in Table 4.
Transition and Summary
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit
size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction. The research question for this study
was as follows: What is the relationship between federal compliance requirement,
executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction?
The targeted population for this study was nonprofit social services organizations,
schools, institutions of higher learning, housing organizations, and hospitals. Multiple
linear regression was the statistical technique used to answer the research question. The
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implications for positive social change include the potential for nonprofit boards of
directors and executives to increase their awareness of nonprofit business leaders’ social
responsibility to beneficiaries and positive social change in their behavior. Nonprofit
business leaders can improve operational efficiencies in the provision of social,
education, housing, health, and economic development services to those in society and
communities who need them the most.
In Section 3, I include a restatement of the research question and hypotheses.
Section 3 also includes the presentation of findings, applications to professional practice,
implications for social change, recommendations for action and further research,
reflections, and conclusions.
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative correlation study was to examine the
relationships between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation,
nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction identified during nonprofit
organizations’ audits. The model as a whole was able to significantly predict internal
control infraction, F(7, 136) = 6.559, p < .001, R2 = .252. I rejected the null hypothesis
and accepted the alternative; a relationship exists between federal compliance
requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control
infraction.
Presentation of the Findings
In this subheading, I discuss testing the assumptions, present descriptive statistics,
and inferential statistic results, provide a theoretical conversation about the findings, and
concluded with a concise summary. I employed multiple linear regression, with a sample
of 144 nonprofits, to address the possible relationship between federal compliance
requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control
infraction. The confidence interval was 95%, where appropriate. The significance level
was 5% throughout this research.
Tests of Assumptions
An evaluation of the assumptions of multicollinearity, normality, linearity,
homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals occurred in this study.
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Multicollinearity. The evaluation of multicollinearity occurred by viewing the
correlation coefficient among predictor variables. All bivariate correlations were small to
medium (see Table 5); therefore, a violation of the assumption of multicollinearity was
not evident. The following table contains the correlation coefficients.
Table 5
Correlation Coefficients Among Study Predictor Variables (N = 144)

Housing
School
Hospital

Housing School

Hospital

1
-0.33**
-0.33**

1
-0.15

1

-0.13
-0.07
-0.17*
-0.28**

**

Social
-0.27
Size
-0.21*
Compensation 0.48**
Fedcomreq

0.75**

Social

Size

Compensation Fedcomreq

-0.13
0.41**
-0.19*

1
-.078
-0.11

1
-0.14

1

0.03

-0.18*

-0.14

0.44**

1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Outliers, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of
residuals. The evaluation of outliers, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and
independence of residuals involved examining the normal probability plot (P-P) of the
regression standardized residual (see Figure 2) and the scatterplot of the standardized
residual (see Figure 3). The examination indicated there was a violation of the outliers
assumption. Two nonprofit hospitals had revenues that far exceeded the average. The
tendency of the standardized residuals to not lie in a reasonably straight line (see Figure
2), diagonal from the bottom left to the top right, provided supportive evidence that a
gross violation of the assumption of normality has occurred (Garson, 2012). The lack of a
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clear or systematic pattern in the scatterplot of the standardized residuals (see Figure 3)
supported the tenability of the linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals
assumptions being violated.

Figure 2. Normal probability plot (P-P) of the regression standardized residuals.
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of the standardized residuals.

Descriptive Statistics
The population included 2,771 nonprofit organizations. I selected 153 nonprofits
for the initial sample and eliminated nine because of missing data which resulted in 144
nonprofits included in the final sample. Descriptive statistics of the ratio variables appear
in Table 6.
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations for Quantitative Study Variables
Descriptive Statistics
Statistic

ICWSCORE

FEDCOMPREQ

SIZEb

COMPENSATION

Mean
Std. Dev.
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
N

4.92
6.146
144
12.64
1.397
144
0.01
0.027
144
169874
205946
144

Bias

-.04
-.053
0
.00
-0.006
0
0.00
-0.004
0
-344
-2281
0

Std.
Error
.47
.509
0
.12
0.080
0
0.00
0.009
0
16638
21722
0

Bootstrapa
95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
4.01
5.091
144
12.35
1.258
144
0.00
0.006
144
142942
162362
144

Upper
5.92
7.070
144
12.85
1.551
144
0.01
0.040
144
204869
251767
144

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples
b. Revenue is a proxy for nonprofit size
Inferential Results
The study involved using standard multiple linear regression, α = .05 (two-tailed),
to examine the efficacy of the independent variables, that is, federal compliance requirement,

executive compensation, nonprofit size, and nonprofit type, in predicting internal control
infraction. In the regression analysis, institutions of higher learning served as the
reference group for the nonprofit type variable. The null hypothesis was that there was no
significant relationship between federal compliance requirement, executive
compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and internal control infraction. The
alternative hypothesis was that there was a significant relationship between federal
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compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and
internal control infraction.
Preliminary analyses took place to assess whether the assumptions of
multicollinearity, outliers, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of
residuals existed. The results of the preliminary analyses included a violation of the
outliers’ assumption but did not include any serious violation of normality, linearity,
homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals assumptions (see the Tests of
Assumptions section). The model as a whole was able to predict a significant relationship
between nonprofit type, executive compensation, and internal control infraction, F(7,
136) = 6.559, p < .001, R2 = 0.252. The R2 = 0.252 value indicated that the linear
combination of the predictor variables (nonprofit type and executive compensation)
accounted for approximately 26% of variations in internal control.
In the final model, nonprofit type and executive compensation significantly
predicted internal control infraction but federal compliance requirements and nonprofit
size did not explain any significant variation in internal control infraction. The final
predictive equation was as follows:
ICWSCORE = α + β1*FEDCOMREQ + β2*COMPENSATION + β3*SIZE + β3*SCHOOL +
β4*SOCIAL + β5*HOSPITALS + β6*HOUSING + e… (1)
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Table 7
Regression Analysis Summary for the Predictor Variables
95% Confidence
Interval for B

(Constant)
FEDCOMPREQ
COMPENSATION
SIZE
NONPROFTYPE
HOSPITAL
SCHOOL
SOCIAL
HOUSING

β

t

p

Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

6.555
0.578
0.025
18.955

0.026
-0.115
-0.031

1.270
0.201
-1.960
-.375

0.206
0.841
0.050
0.708

-4.638
-1.027
-0.121
-44.59

21.287
1.259
0.023
30.372

1.894
1.587
1.769
1.929

-0.519
-0.404
-0.351
-0.298

-4.959
-4.612
-4.099
-1.926

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.056

-13.13
-10.45
-10.74
-7.529

-5.646
-4.181
-3.752
0.099

B

SE B

8.325
0.116
-0.049
-7.112
-9.392
-7.319
-7.250
-3.715

Note. The measurement of federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, and
nonprofit size is at the ratio level. Institutions of higher learning is the reference variable
and the other four variables (i.e., schools, institutions of higher learning, hospitals, and
nonprofit social services organizations) are dummy variables.

Executive compensation. The negative slope of executive compensation (B = 0.049) as a predictor of internal control infraction indicated there was a decrease of 0.049
in internal control infraction for each $1 increase in compensation or approximately a
decrease of approximately 5 units in the number of internal infractions for every
additional $100 of compensation (see Table 7). In other words, internal control infraction
tended to decrease as executive compensation increased.
Nonprofit type. The categories of nonprofit type variable, (i.e., hospital, schools,
and social services), helped to determine the occurrence and magnitude of internal
control infraction. In table 7, hospitals, schools, and social services were significant
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predictors of internal infraction at the 5% level, with the hospital category of nonprofit
type variable accounting for the highest contribution (B = -9.392). The housing category
of the nonprofit type variable did not contribute significantly (B = -.3.715) to the model.
Analysis Summary
The purpose of this quantitative correlation study was to examine the relationships between federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size,
nonprofit type, and internal control infraction identified in audits of nonprofit
organizations. I used standard multiple linear regression to examine the ability of federal
compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, and nonprofit type to
predict the value of internal control infraction. Assumptions surrounding multiple
regression were assessed with the results of the assessment included a violation of the
outliers’ assumption but did not include any serious violation of normality, linearity,
homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals assumptions. The model used in this
study, as a whole, was able to predict internal control infraction significantly, F(7, 136) =
6.559, p < .001, R2 = 0.252. Nonprofit type and executive compensation provided useful
predictive information about internal control infraction.
Theoretical Conversation on Findings
The findings of this study align with Kobelsky et al. (2013) who examined the
effects of the compensation of CEOs and CFOs on the quality of internal control and the
relationship between incentives for performance-based compensation and internal control
quality over financial reporting. Kobelsky et al. provided evidence that a statistically
positive relationship existed between CEOs’ salary compensation and internal control
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infraction. The relationship between performance-based compensation sensitivity (i.e.,
short-term and long-term incentives) and internal control infraction was negative for
CFOs (p < .05) but not for CEOs. A positive relationship existed between CEOs’
performance-based compensation and internal control infraction reported.
An analysis of sample firms by Hou et al. (2014) showed a decline in firm
performance from nonperformance-based compensation (i.e., salary) or a statistically
significant negative relationship between non-performance-based compensation and firm
performance. There was an opposite effect for performance-based compensation (i.e.,
bonuses and options). The findings from this study supported the findings of Hou et al.
(2014) and Kobelsky et al. (2013) who used agency theory to explain the relationship
between executive compensation and agent’s actions, as well as to identify the most
efficient contract to govern the relationship between agent and principal. Based on their
study, Hou et al. suggested that agency theory explained the relationship between CEO
compensation and internal control which supported the proposition that agency theory is
suitable as a theoretical framework for this study. The model used in this study, as a
whole, was able to predict internal control infraction significantly, F(7, 136) = 6.559, p <
.001, R2 = 0.252. The negative slope of executive compensation (-0.049) as a predictor of
internal control infraction indicated there was about a 0.049 decrease in internal control
infraction for each $1 increase in compensation or approximately 5 units decrease in the
number of internal infractions for every additional $100 of compensation. Therefore,
internal control infraction tended to decrease as executive compensation increased.
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Petrovits et al. (2011) and Saat et al. (2013) examined the relationship between
federal compliance requirements, nonprofit size, and internal control infraction.
Likewise, Arshad et al. (2013) and Keating et al. (2005) examined the relationship
between nonprofit size and the level of internal control infraction. The findings in
Petrovits et al.’s study included evidence that the coefficient on federal compliance
requirement and nonprofit size was significantly negative. The findings of this study
supported the results of Petrovits et al. Contrary to the findings of this study and Petrovits
et al., Saat et al. found that nonprofit organizations with complexity of compliance
requirements were more likely to encounter internal control infraction. The results of
Arshad et al.’s study indicated that nonprofit size did not have a significantly positive
relationship with internal control infraction. Contrary to the findings included in Arshad
et al.’s study, Keating et al. (2005) provided evidence that nonprofit size was a significant
predictor of internal control infraction.
Applications to Professional Practice
Managers of nonprofit organizations who understand the relationship between
federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type,
and internal control infraction may be able to implement effective and efficient internal
controls in their organizations resulting in an acceptable level of accountability by
nonprofit managers, fewer internal control infractions, and efficient provision of goods
and services to beneficiaries. In addition, the understanding of the relationship between
federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type,
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and internal control infraction will help regulators to design and implement compliance
requirements that are effective but less arduous than the ones that currently exist.
Implications for Social Change
The implications for positive social change include the potential for a better
understanding, by managers, of the importance of internal controls in nonprofit
organizations. Effective and efficient internal controls in nonprofit organizations are
important because they could potentially lead to an increase in the level of accountability
by managers of nonprofit organizations and to fewer instances of internal control
infraction. Practical implications are that nonprofit leaders can apply the findings of this
study to gain a better understanding of the relationship between the independent variables
and dependent variable resulting in a reduction of the risk of monetary loss because of
noncompliance with regulations, a decrease in insolvencies by nonprofit organizations,
greater accountability by nonprofit organizations’ managers, and an increase in the
provision of goods and services to those in society most in need.
Recommendations for Action
I recommend organization leaders take the following actions. Since one finding of
this study was there is a significantly positive relationship between nonprofit type and
internal control infraction, leaders of nonprofit organizations should ensure that internal
controls are developed with a knowledge of the relationship between their type of
nonprofit organization and internal control infraction. This could mean that the categories
of nonprofit type (i.e., schools, hospitals, and nonprofit social services organizations) are
likely to experience internal control infraction. Nonprofit leaders in schools, hospitals,
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and nonprofit social services organizations should focus on developing and monitoring
internal controls specific to their nonprofit type.
Another finding of this study was that executive compensation is a predictor of
the level of internal control infraction in nonprofit organizations. Based on this finding,
leaders of nonprofit organizations should ensure that executives are adequately
compensated. The results of this study indicated that as executive compensation
increases, internal control infraction tended to decrease; therefore, adequate
compensation should lead to an acceptable level of internal control infraction.
I will share the findings of this study with nonprofit managers, auditors, and
regulators of the nonprofit industry through scholarly journals, business publications,
conferences, and seminars. My focus will be to help nonprofit managers improve their
internal control system and reduce the rate of internal control infraction identified in
nonprofit organizations’ audits.
Recommendations for Further Research
Future research on the topic of internal infraction identified in nonprofit audits
could include the following recommendations. First, future researchers should examine
the quality of accounting, reporting, and compliance data using more robust data
collection techniques. Accessing new data sources, such as the new Form 990 tax return,
will provide more details of nonprofit information, such as more narrative information
pertaining to the organizations’ operations and programs, which can improve the quality
of data. This approach would address one of the weaknesses of archival data, that is,
incomplete data.
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Second, since this study included only the nonprofit population in the southeast
region of the United States, future researchers should focus on the relationship between
the independent variables and internal control infraction, in other regions of the United
States, to confirm or contradict the findings of this study. Conducting similar studies in
other regions of the United States may provide supporting or contradicting results to the
findings of this study. Examining the relationship between the independent and
dependent variables in other regions of the United States should result in findings
generalizable to a broader population.
Third, this quantitative study involved examining the relationship between federal
compliance requirement, executives’ compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type, and
internal control infraction; however, future researchers should conduct research to
examine the relationship between variables not included in this study, such as the
financial performance of nonprofit organizations using net income as a proxy for
performance, total federal funds expended on program activities, the use of Big 4 versus
Non-Big 4 audit firm, and internal control infraction. Studying these variables would
expand the literature on internal controls in nonprofits and the findings could have a
social impact on the clients of nonprofit organizations as well as on society.
Reflections
The Doctor of Business Administration degree program has been a challenge but
exciting experience. I had to master time-management to balance my job, school, and
home life. However, the resources available at Walden University and the interaction
with my cohorts helped me to complete the courses and the doctoral study.
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This research involved examining the relationship between independent variables
(i.e., federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit
type) and internal control infraction identified in audits of nonprofit organizations. This
study was rewarding for many reasons. The study provided answers to questions about
the relationship between independent variables and internal control infraction in nonprofit
organizations and contributed to the literature by identifying some variables not identified
in prior studies. In addition, the study revealed the importance of knowledge concerning
variables related to internal control infraction to managers of nonprofit organizations,
regulators, and academics. With this knowledge, managers of nonprofit organizations and
regulators can implement internal controls and compliance requirements that are effective
and efficient. Effective internal controls and compliance requirements should result in the
efficient provision of goods and services needed by members of society.
Conclusions
The cases of internal control infraction, identified in the audits of nonprofit
organizations, and the number of nonprofit insolvencies highlight the need to understand
the variables related to internal control infraction. The purpose of this quantitative
correlation study was to examine the relationship between independent variables, that is,
federal compliance requirement, executive compensation, nonprofit size, nonprofit type,
and the dependent variable (i.e., internal control infraction). The study involved
collecting data and examining data for 144 nonprofit organizations in the southeast
United States.
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The model used in this study, as a whole, was able to significantly predict internal
control infraction, F(7, 136) = 6.559, p < .001, R2 = 0.252. The results revealed a
significant relationship between executive compensation, nonprofit type, and internal
control infraction, and no significant relationship between federal compliance
requirements, nonprofit size, and internal control infraction. The findings also provided
an answer to the research question and increased the understanding of the theoretical
framework, agency theory, and the relationship between the independent variables and
dependent variable. The findings of this study led to recommended actions for positive
social change in the nonprofit industry, such as, nonprofit leaders should gain a better
understanding of the relationship between the independent variables and dependent
variable in this study which could lead to an increase in the provision of goods and
services to those in society most in need. I also recommended that future research
examine the relationship between independent variables not included in this study and
internal control infraction, and include other geographical areas.
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